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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
AN ASPECT-BASED APPROACH TO MODELING ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES
Access control policies determine how sensitive information and computing resources are
to be protected. Enforcing these policies in a system design typically results in access
control features that crosscut the dominant structure of the design (that is, features that
are spread across and intertwined with other features in the design). The spreading and
intertwining of access control features make it difficult to understand, analyze, and change
them and thus complicate the task of ensuring that an evolving design continues to enforce
access control policies.
Researchers have advocated the use of aspect-oriented modeling (AOM) techniques
for addressing the problem of evolving crosscutting features. This dissertation proposes an
approach to modeling and analyzing crosscutting access control features. The approach uti-
lizes AOM techniques to isolate crosscutting access control features as patterns described
by aspect models. Incorporating an access control feature into a design involves embedding
instantiated forms of the access control pattern into the design model. When composing
instantiated access control patterns with a design model, one needs to ensure that the result-
ing composed model enforces access control policies. The approach includes a technique
to verify that specified policies are enforced in the composed model.
The approach is illustrated using two well-known access control models: the Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC) model and the Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model. Features that
enforce RBAC and BLP models are described by aspect models. We show how the aspect
iii
models can be composed to create a new hybrid access control aspect model. We also show
how one can verify that composition of a base (primary) design model and an aspect model
that enforces specified policies produces a composed model in which the policies are still
enforced.
Eunjee Song
Department of Computer Science
Colorado State University
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Organizations specify and enforce access control policies to protect their valuable infor-
mation and resources from malicious attacks. These access control policies determine,
for example, (1) what programs or persons can access protected resources, (2) under what
circumstances these access rights are granted, and (3) what information items and services
are made available to authorized users. Developers of applications that must enforce access
control policies have to answer the following questions:
  How can one check that an access control feature adequately enforces the policies as
intended?
  How can one check that an access control feature interacts with other features to
produce behaviors that satisfy specified properties?
The research in this dissertation provides answers to the above questions.
1.1 Research Motivation
Modularization of design in terms of key functional features1 results in the intertwining
of access control features with other features. For example, a decision to modularize the
1In this dissertation, a feature is a logical unit of behavior.
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design of a banking system in terms of modules that encapsulate banking services (e.g.,
withdraw and deposit services) results in the scattering of access control design elements
across the modules containing resources that are to be protected from unauthorized ac-
cesses. In general, crosscutting access control features are problematic for the following
reasons:
  Understanding a crosscutting feature is difficult because its description is scattered
across a design.
  Changing the crosscutting feature requires making consistent changes in a number
of places in the design.
  Evaluating alternative forms of the feature is challenging because it is difficult to
replace the feature with an alternative.
The above problems complicate the following tasks:
  Verifying policy enforcement: Rigorously establishing that a design enforces spec-
ified access control policies requires checking that the design elements describing
the access control feature enforce the policies. If the elements are scattered across
a design and tangled with other design elements then verification of the policy en-
forcement becomes difficult.
  Integrating policies: Organizations may need to share their access controlled re-
sources with other organizations. This can occur when the organizations need to
collaborate on a project or when one organization is acquired by another. In these
cases the issue of composing independently developed policies needs to be addressed.
However, determining how the features are to be integrated so that they may enforce
target policies is difficult when they are intertwined with other application features.
Aspect-oriented modeling (AOM) techniques have been advocated as solutions for
making the above tasks easier by isolating crosscutting access control features from other
2
features in the design. However, when isolated access control features are composed with
a design, one needs to ensure that the result of composition still enforces the target policy.
The goal of this research is to provide a technique for verifying that a design produced by
composing access control features and other design features enforces specified policies and
has other stated properties.
1.2 Research Overview
We utilize AOM techniques proposed by France et al. [31] to localize descriptions of
crosscutting access control features in aspect models. In the AOM approach, a design
consists of aspect models and a primary model. Each aspect model describes a crosscutting
design feature that addresses a single concern [69]. The primary model describes the core
functionality that determines the dominant design structure. An application design in which
the concerns are addressed is created by composing the aspect models with the primary
model. Composition directives are used to help ensure that the composition produces a
desired model.
In this work, access control features that are to be incorporated into a software design
(the primary model) are described by aspect models. We use Unified Modeling Language
(UML) model template notation that is a specialization of the Role-Based Modeling Lan-
guage (RBML)2[30] to express aspect models. The techniques described in this dissertation
are specifically targeted to designs expressed using the UML, a popular, standard modeling
language.
The following techniques are developed in this dissertation: (1) A technique for veri-
fying that an aspect model enforces the given policy, (2) a technique for integrating aspect
models to describe different access control mechanisms, and (3) a technique for composing
2RBML is a subset of the UML [90] with semantics that support rigorous analysis of policy models
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an aspect model and a primary model in a verifiable manner.
1.2.1 Verifying Policy Enforcement in an Access Control Aspect
Model
Fig. 1.1 shows our approach to verifying that an access control aspect enforces target ac-
cess control policies. A policy model is a UML description of an access control policy.
Figure 1.1: Checking policy enforcement in an aspect model
An aspect model describes an access control feature. Realization mappings describe how
elements in the policy model are realized in the aspect model3. Using these mappings we
transform the policy constraints defined in a policy model into constraints expressed in
terms of concepts in an aspect model. An access control aspect model enforces policies in
a policy model if transformed policy constraints hold in an aspect model.
3Realization in our work is an abstraction relationship between two sets of model elements, one repre-
senting a policy model (policy requirements) and the other represents an aspect model (a set of designs that
enforce the given policy model)
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1.2.2 Composing Access Control Aspect Models
Complex applications are typically required to enforce multiple access control policies.
Instead of composing the aspects one at a time with a primary model, the aspects can be
composed a priori to create a composed aspect. One advantage of doing this is that it
provides a view in which the interactions across the aspects can be understood in isolation.
A second advantage is that it reduces the number of times the composition process must be
applied, especially when the composed aspect is used in several applications.
In this work, we provide a method for using composition directives to obtain an inte-
grated access control aspect. Fig. 1.2 shows our approach to using composition directives
Figure 1.2: Integrating two aspect models to create a composed aspect model that enforces
an integrated policy
for integrating two access control aspects to produce an aspect model that enforces a pol-
icy (Policy Model 3) that is an integration of the access control policies (Policy Model 1
& 2) enforced by the two access control aspects. Composition directives are used to help
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one create a composed aspect model that enforces the integrated policy. The developer uses
his/her knowledge of how the policies are to be integrated to select appropriate composition
directives that will be used to compose the aspect models. The developer is responsible for
ensuring that the result enforces the integrated policies. The enforcement technique pro-
posed in this dissertation can be used for this purpose. The approach will be demonstrated
using an example from the military domain which requires applications that enforce the in-
tegration of two well-known access control policies; Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
and Bell-LaPadula (BLP) policies.
1.2.3 Composing an Access Control Aspect Model and a Primary
Model in a Verifiable Manner
Composing an aspect model with a primary model can result in conflicts or compromised
behaviors. Therefore, a key issue in applying the AOM approach is determining whether
composition of an aspect model and a primary model produces a composed model that has
desired properties. To address this issue we provide an approach that allows one to check
that the result of a composition is correct with respect to formally stated properties.
Figure 1.3: Composing an access control aspect model with a primary model
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Fig. 1.3 shows how an access control aspect model can be incorporated into an applica-
tion design in a verifiable manner. When we use the AOM techniques proposed by France
et al. [31], composition is performed as follows: (1) an access control aspect is instanti-
ated in the context of the application to produce a context-specific access control aspect that
presents an application-specific view of the crosscutting feature (2) this context-specific ac-
cess control aspect is composed with the primary model.
We extend the previous model composition approach by France et al. [31] to support the
generation of proof obligations that must be discharged in order to establish that a desired
property holds in the composed class model. In our composition approach, class diagrams
are merged first, but the entire composition does not end until after the proof obligation
is generated and evaluated. When generating the proof obligations, we use the property to
verify (shown in Fig. 1.3). Verifying that a composed model has the stated property requires
one to discharge the generated proof obligation.
If the property does not hold then one can attempt to use composition directives to alter
the manner in which the composition is done to help rectify the problem. The properties
that are targeted by the technique are those that constrain the effects of sequences of oper-
ations on the system state as represented by object structures. To facilitate automation we
restrict the forms of operation specifications and target properties.
1.3 Research Scope and Significance
In this research, designs are described using only UML class models and thus the tech-
niques are specific to class model composition. Aspect models in this research consist only
of class diagram templates which can be instantiated to produce class diagrams. However,
we provide a technique to derive partial sequence diagrams from the class model compo-
sition when all message invocations by an operation are stated in the postcondition of its
operation specification.
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We use a name-based composition approach [31, 86] for composing two aspect models
and for composing context-specific aspect models and a primary model. The default proce-
dure in the name-based composition merges model elements that have the same name and
syntactic type to produce a single model element in the composed model [86]. This pro-
cedure assumes that elements with the same name represent consistent views of the same
concept [73]. We use the composition approach to compose an RBAC aspect model with a
banking primary model, and to compose RBAC and BLP aspect models to create a hybrid
access control aspect model.
The research provides an approach to verifying the enforcement of access control aspect
models against the given requirements described in policy models, where policy models are
policy specifications represented using the same notation used for specifying access control
aspect models. We assume that valid policy models are provided by a developer.
This research is significant in that it provides a methodical approach to verifying com-
posed models. Separating crosscutting access control features as aspect models eases the
tasks of analyzing access control features during design. When composing access con-
trol aspect models with a primary design model, the verification technique provided in this
research allows one to systematically verify that the resulting composed model satisfies
specified properties that constrain the effects of operations on system state.
In this research, the verification technique is used to uncover problems and composition
directives are used to fix known problems. For example, when an integrated access control
policy is required, it may be known that the default merging procedure will not produce the
desired result. Composition directives can be used to help ensure that the composition pro-
duces the desired result. The result of the composition can be verified using the technique
proposed in this dissertation.
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1.4 Dissertation Structure Overview
Chapter 2 summarizes the state of the research related to modeling access control policies.
Chapter 3 gives the background needed to understand the concepts introduced in this dis-
sertation. Chapter 4 describes how access control features can be modeled as aspect models
that enforce the given policy requirements. Chapter 5 shows how two access control poli-
cies can be integrated with each other using the AOM composition. Chapter 6 illustrates
a verifiable composition approach by showing how an access control aspect model can be
incorporated into application features in an automatable and verifiable manner. Chapter 7




Our work is related to two distinct research areas: aspect-oriented software development
(AOSD) and security policy. This chapter gives an overview of relevant work in these two
areas and presents related work in the area of specifying access control models using UML.
2.1 Aspect-Oriented Software Development (AOSD)
Aspect-Oriented Software Development (AOSD) supports the separation of concerns prin-
ciple that has proven to be effective at handling complexity [14]. AOSD methods allow
developers to represent pervasive design and implementation concerns as aspects. In an
AOD approach, a design consists of (1) a primary design or implementation artifact (e.g.,
a UML model or code) in which the pervasive concerns are not included, (2) a set of
aspects, each representing a pervasive design concern that impacts the elements of the
primary design artifact, and (3) a composing mechanism that composes aspects with the
primary artifact to obtain a view of the design that integrate the primary and aspect model
views. Examples of AOSD approaches are (1) aspect-oriented programming (e.g., see
[10, 45, 46, 61, 62, 82, 87]) in which the primary design artifacts are code, and aspects are
concerns that cross-cut code modules, and (2)aspect-oriented modeling (or design) (e.g.
see [20, 21, 28, 38, 88]) in which aspects are design realizations of requirements, and a
design is created by composing aspects.
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Suzuki et al. [88] extend the UML so that it can be used to model code level as-
pects. Their approach is restricted to secondary system characteristics that can be repre-
sented as aspects in an aspect-oriented program. Our approach differs since we do not
require aspect-oriented programming techniques. Gray et al. [38] use aspects to repre-
sent secondary system characteristics in domain-specific models. Their research is part of
the Model-Integrated Computing (MIC) initiative that targets embedded software systems
specifically. MIC extends the scope and usage of models such that they form the back-
bone of a development process for building embedded software systems. Requirements,
architecture, and the environment of a system are captured in the form of formal high-level
models that allow the representation of concerns. Our work can complement their research
by providing a UML-based approach for describing aspects.
The Theme/UML approach 1 proposed by Clarke et al. [18, 19, 21] and Baniassad et
al. [5] is a UML-based approach that is closest to the AOM method we use. In their work, a
design, called a theme, is created for each system requirement. These themes, like context-
specific aspect models and primary models, are design views. A comprehensive design is
obtained by composing themes. Composition relationships specify how models are to be
composed by identifying overlapping concepts in the themes and specifying how models
are integrated. Two types of integration strategies are used: override and merge. Override
integration is used when existing behavior in a theme needs to be updated to reflect new
requirements. Merge integration is used when subjects for different requirements are to
be integrated. A theme which has behaviors triggered by other themes is called as an
aspect (or a crosscutting theme) in the Theme/UML approach. This type of theme can be
parameterized to handle the triggers for its behavior using UML templates.
As part of the early aspects initiative, Rashid et. al have targeted multi-dimensional
1referred to as subject-oriented design approach with composition patterns in their earlier work
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separation beginning early in the software cycle [65, 66, 67, 68]. Their work supports
modularization of broadly scoped properties at the requirements level to establish early
trade-offs, provide decision support and promote traceability to artifacts at later develop-
ment stages. Our AOM method compliments this work by supporting aspect specification,
composition, and analysis of successively more detailed levels of abstraction needed during
system design.
2.2 Security Policies and Access Control Models
In this section we briefly describe some work on security policies and access control
models. Damianou’s thesis [22] provides a comprehensive survey of important work
in this area. A large volume of research exists in the area of access control poli-
cies. In this section we describe related work in the area of specifying security policies
[6, 7, 12, 16, 23, 39, 41, 42, 43, 49, 57, 59, 74, 92], the area of specifying access control
models [1, 4, 8, 9, 11, 17, 35, 55, 75, 78].
Formal logic-based approaches [6, 7, 12, 16, 39, 43, 59] are often used to specify se-
curity policies. Jajodia et al. [43] propose an authorization specification language (ASL)
based on stratified clause form logic. Both negative and positive authorizations can be
expressed using this logic. The language also includes integrity rules that can be used to
specify application-dependent conditions that limit the range of acceptable access control
policies. This language provides support for role based access control but no direct support
for delegations or obligations. Barker [6] also uses stratified clause form logic to express
access control policies with special attention to RBAC. These approaches assume a strong
mathematical background which makes one use and understand the specified policies dif-
ficult.
In a subsequent work [7], Barker et al. show how policies specified in stratified logic
can be translated into SQL to protect a relational database from unauthorized read and up-
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date requests. Ortalo [59] describes a language for specifying security policies based on
deontic logic. Researchers [39] at the Cambridge University have defined a language called
Role Definition Language (RDL) based on Horn clauses. RDL is based on a set of rules
that indicate the conditions under which a client may obtain a name or role. The conditions
for obtaining a role depend on the credentials of the client. The notion of delegation in
RDL is different in the sense that roles and not access rights are delegated. A client may
delegate a role that he himself does not possess. Chen et al. [16] propose a language based
on set theory for specifying RBAC state related constraints. Bertino et al. [12] extends the
RBAC model with a temporal model called a Temporal Role-Based Access Control (TR-
BAC) model. The language proposed by Bertino can specify periodic activation and deac-
tivation of roles using periodic expressions. They can also specify temporal dependencies
among role activation and deactivation using role triggers. Formal logic-based approaches,
although, useful for analyzing security policies, are relatively difficult to implement.
Other researchers have used high-level languages to specify policies [41, 42, 57, 74].
Although high-level languages are easier to understand than formal logic-based ap-
proaches, they are not analyzable. Ribeiro et al. [74] propose a Security Policy Language
(SPL) for specifying authorization and obligation policies. Policies are specified using
constraint rules. Tower [41] is a language for specifying RBAC policies. The policies
are specified using objects, privileges, permissions, users, and roles. Privileges define a
specific access type on an object, permissions are composed of privileges, and roles con-
tain a set of permissions. In addition privileges can also be associated with conditions and
actions. Conditions limit the applicability of the privilege. Actions are executed when
methods associated with the privileges are invoked. The Organization for the Advance-
ment of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) technical committee advocates the use
of XML for expressing access control policies [57]. They proposed XACML which is an
XML specification for expressing policies for information access over the Internet. The
policy specification in XACML is very verbose and not aimed for human interpretation.
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LaSCO [42] is a graphical approach for specifying policies. The graphical format of
LaSCO helps in human interpretation but is not very expressive. Ponder [23] is a speci-
fication language that allows various kinds of policies, such as, authorization, obligation,
and delegation policies to be specified. Policies are specified in terms of subject-domain,
target-domain, and access-lists. The subject-domain specifies the set of subjects that can
perform the operations specified in the access-lists on the objects in the target-domain. The
authors have also developed a toolkit for policy specification and deployment [24].
The area of conflict analysis of security policy has also received some attention. Lupu
and Sloman [52] elaborate on policy conflicts that may occur in large-scale distributed sys-
tems and describe a conflict analysis tool that is a part of a Role Based Management Frame-
work. The authors investigate conflicts in authorization and obligation policies. Sibleyet
al. [81, 80] have identified the need for automated tools to specify and analyze policies.
They have used both first order logic and an object-oriented approach to represent policy.
The policies considered are not limited to access control policies but general rules about
the system. Policies are formalized in predicate calculus with the help of enhanced entity
relationship diagrams. A theorem prover is used to detect inconsistencies in the specifi-
cation [53]. Minsky [54] proposes the notion of “law governed systems”. These systems
implement a common global set of constraints by using filters in every node that ensure
that all interactions are consistent with the global law.
Tidswell and Jaeger [92] propose an approach to visualizing access control constraints.
They point out the need for visualizing constraints and the limitations of previous work
(e.g., [2, 56, 60]) on expressing constraints. Another effort to graphical specification of
RBAC is proposed by Koch et al. [49]. In their approach, RBAC policies are represented by
graph transformations. A graph consists of nodes and edges. Nodes represent notions such
as users and roles. Edges represent relationships between notions. Transformation rules
are defined for administration activities such as adding a user to a role and removing a user
from a role. Consistency properties such as DSD constraints are also specified graphically.
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Verification of RBAC policies is carried out by showing that graphical constraints do not
occur in the graph specifying RBAC policies. The drawback of these two approaches
is that they created a new notation for specifying constraints and it is not clear how the
new notation can be integrated with other widely-used design notations. The approach
described in this research utilizes notations from a standardized modeling language and
also integrates the policy specification activity with design modeling activities.
Abadi et al. [1] presents a calculus for access control which enables one to formally
reason about whether access requests should be granted or not. The calculus uses a notion
of principals as the sources of requests; a principal can be simple or composite (groups
of principals). The model supports delegation of access rights but does not allow one to
specify the conditions under which delegation can take place. The proposed calculus is not
able to support temporal constraints on authorizations or delegations. Bertino et al. [11]
propose a formal model for extending authorizations with temporal constraints. They allow
the specification of periodic authorizations and authorizations that are valid over specific
time periods. The model also allows runtime derivation of new authorizations based on the
presence or absence of existing authorizations. Samarati et al. [75] suggests adding more
general conditions to authorization rules, such as, conditions involving the system state, the
state of the object that is being accessed, and on the object’s access history. This work also
recognizes the need for both positive and negative authorizations. Negative authorizations
specify the accesses that should not be granted. The presence of both positive and negative
authorizations often lead to inconsistencies which must be detected and resolved.
In our approach, access control policies and access control models are expressed using
UML-based notations. Therefore, UML tools can be used to specify them.
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2.3 Modeling Access Control Features in UML
Approaches to specifying and analyzing access control features that are based on sophis-
ticated mathematical concepts, formally stated, allow one to check that developed access
control features enforce required polices. In practice, however, applying mathematically-
based formal specification techniques can be difficult because of the high degree of math-
ematical skill needed. Therefore, a representation that can be analyzed without sacrificing
understandability and usability is desirable.
In this regard, there has been some work on using the UML to model security features
(e.g., see [3, 15, 44, 50]. Chan and Kwok [15] model a design pattern for security that
addresses asset and functional distribution, vulnerability, threat, and impact of loss. UML
stereotypes identify classes that have particular security needs due to their vulnerability
either as assets or as a result of functional distribution. Lodderstedt et al. [50] propose
SecureUML and define a vocabulary for annotating UML-based models with information
relevant to access control. It is based on the model for basic RBAC with support for role
hierarchies. The concepts of RBAC such as User, Role, and Permission are represented
as metamodel types. An access control policy is realized mainly by using declarative ac-
cess control. This means that the access control policy is configured in the deployment
descriptors of an EJB component.
Steen et al. [85] propose a new language for expressing policies that can be applied
over an enterprise that is modeled using UML. The language contains embedded OCL
constraints. The constraints cannot specify activation/deactivation of roles or assignment
of users or permissions to roles. It also does not allow for the composition of policies.
Jürjens [44] models security mechanisms based on the multi-level classification of data
in a system using an extended form of the UML called UMLsec. The UML tag extension
mechanism is used to denote sensitive data. Statechart diagrams model the dynamic behav-
ior of objects, and sequence diagrams are used to model protocols. Deployment diagrams
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are also used to model links between components across servers. UMLsec is fully de-
scribed in a UML profile. These approaches mainly focus on extending the UML notation
to better reflect security concerns. The approach described in this research complements the
UMLsec by capturing access control policies in patterns that can be reused by developers
of secure systems.
France et al. [29] and Georg et al. [34] have shown how concerns can be modeled as
aspects, expressed as structural and behavioral patterns specifications, and composed with
designs expressed in the UML (e.g., security concerns [32, 34], and authentication and
auditing [33]). The above works have also shown that the order in which the aspects are
composed is important.
The aspect composition approach in this research builds upon the techniques described
in earlier works (e.g., see [29, 31, 32, 34, 48, 69, 70, 84]). France et al. [29] and Georg et
al. [32, 34] show how security concerns can be localized and then composed with models
of system functionality. Kim et al. [48] and Ray et al. [70] present how invalid structures
can be captured and expressed using object diagram templates suggested in the work by
France et al. [30]. France et al. [31] extends the earlier works by George et al. [32, 34] by
refining the aspect modeling notation and instantiation process, and providing the notion of
composition directives to compose a context-specific aspect with a primary model. Ray et
al. [69] use the AOM based approach for describing access control schemes (e.g., RBAC)
and incorporating it into a primary model to produce a composed model and the composed
model are analyzed to identify undesirable emergent behaviors. The above earlier works
focused on modeling access control features as aspects and incorporating an aspect model
into a primary model. Whereas, in the work by Ray et al. [71] two access control aspects
are integrated, but the composition was not systematic.
This dissertation extends the work by Ray et al. [71] by providing a systematic ap-
proach to composing aspect models and is also an extension of works by Kim et al. [48]




Model-based verification is another area that is close to our approach. As summarized
in [93], model-based verification is a process for identifying and correcting errors, which
requires integrating established modeling techniques, formal specification methods, and
model checking approaches into a systematic software engineering practice. Gluch et al.
[36, 37] and Engels et al. [25] present a model-based verification techniques for software
engineering practices. Most of model-based verification work [25, 36, 37, 93] use a model
checking tool (e.g., PVS [93] or FDR [51]) for analysis part. Our approach is also in along
the same lines in that models are verified at the model level before they are implemented.
However, none of the above mentioned approaches addresses identifying problematic com-




This chapter presents background information needed to understand the concepts and no-
tations used in this dissertation.
3.1 Access Control Systems
Access control is the process of ensuring that accesses to protected resources adhere to a set
of predefined policies. Access control mechanisms are used to help meet confidentiality1,
integrity2 and availability3 goals in software systems [26].
An access control system is typically described in three ways: access control policies,
mechanisms, and models [75]. Access control policies are security requirements that de-
scribe how access is managed, what information can be accessed and by whom, and under
what conditions that information can be accessed [26]. The access control mechanism
defines the low-level functions that implement the controls imposed by the policies [75].
1Confidentiality refers to the need to keep information secure and private. The condition of confidentiality
requires that only authorized users can read information.
2The condition of integrity requires that unauthorized persons, processes or devices cannot modify infor-
mation.
3Availability refers to the notion that information is available for use when needed.
19
These policies are enforced via mechanisms that mediate access requests and grant or deny
requested accesses. An access control model specifies an access control system. Access
control models must provide ways to reason about the policies they support and prove the
security properties of the access control system [40].
3.2 Access Control Policies
There are several well-known access control policies, which can be categorized as discre-
tionary or non-discretionary. Typically, discretionary access control (DAC) policies are
associated with identity-based access control and non-discretionary access controls are as-
sociated with rule-based controls (for example, mandatory access control (MAC) policy).
DAC policies restrict accesses to targets based on the identity of the individual user or
group. DAC uses an access matrix model to reason about which subjects can perform
which operations on which objects. The rows in an access matrix A correspond to the sub-
jects S, the columns correspond to the objects O, and the entry A

s  o  corresponds to the
actions that subject s can perform on the object o. MAC policies enforce access controls
on the basis of fixed regulations mandated by a centralized authority, not by the individual
owner of an object. For example, MAC occurs in military security, where an individual
data owner does not decide who has a Top Secret clearance, nor can the owner change the
classification of an object from Top Secret to Secret [63].
Role-based Access Control (RBAC) that was introduced in the late nineties is another
well-known type of access control policy. Although RBAC is technically a form of non-
discretionary access control [64], RBAC is often considered as one of three primary access
control policies together with DAC and MAC. RBAC is an approach to restricting system
access to authorized users based on the roles that users play in the organization. In this dis-
sertation, we model access control models that enforce MAC policies and RBAC policies
respectively.
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Policies can be classified as generic policies and context-specific policies. A generic
policy is a statement that can be applied to a set of applications. An example of a generic
policy is given below:
Example 1 “Information items classified as secret can be viewed only by users having a
security clearance of secret or higher.”
The above statement is generic in that it implicitly defines the specific information items
and users impacted in terms of a property (the “secret” property). Specifically, the policy
refers to a category of information items that have the characteristic of being “secret” and
it requires a pattern of behavior in which request to view a secret item results in a check of
the user’s security clearance level.
A context-specific policy is a statement that explicitly identifies the constrained entities
and processes. Unlike generic policies, a context-specific policy is specific to an applica-
tion. A context-specific version of the policy given in Example 1 is given below:
Example 2 “Project Gemini files classified as secret can be viewed only by Project Gemini
Supervisors with a security clearance of secret or higher.”
3.3 Access Control Models
The most cited MAC model is the Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model [9] in which the subjects
are cleared at different security levels and the objects are also classified at different secu-
rity levels. The access privileges that a subject has on an object depends on the security
clearance of the subject and the security classification of the object. In the BLP model, the
rules under which the subjects can read or write objects are defined in terms of the security
levels of subjects and objects. The BLP is aimed at providing confidentiality. A similar
model called the Biba model was proposed for integrity [13]. In RBAC models, accesses
to protected information is determined by the operations that users playing roles execute in
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a session. A role is defined as the set of access rights associated with a particular position
in the organization. Access rights are not specified with respect to users, but with respect
to roles.
In the following subsections, we describe BLP and RBAC models in more details.
3.3.1 Bell-LaPadula (BLP) Model
The BLP model [9] is defined in terms of a security structure

L  , where L is a set of
security levels (e.g., Top Secret, Secret) and  is a dominance relation between these levels.
The main components of this model are objects, users, and subjects. Objects contain or
receive information. Each object in the Bell-LaPadula model is associated with a security
level which is called the classification of the object. Each user is associated with a security
level that is referred to as the clearance of the user. Each user is also associated with one
or more subjects. Subjects are processes that are executed on behalf of some user logged
in at a specific security level. The security level associated with a subject is the same as the
level at which the user has logged in.
The access control policies enforced in the Bell-LaPadula model are specified in terms
of subjects and objects. The policies for reading and writing objects are given by two
properties stated below:
  Simple Security Property: A subject S may have read access to an object O only if
the security level of the subject L

S  dominates the security level of the object L  O  ,
that is, L

S  L  O  .
 	 Property: A subject S may have write access to an object O only if the security
level of the subject L





 L  S  .
The restricted star property given below provides integrity as well as confidentiality:
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  restricted-  Property: A subject S may have write access to an object O only if the
security level of the object L

O  is the same as the security level of the subject L  S  ,
that is, L

O  L  S  .
3.3.2 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
RBAC [27] is used to protect information targets (henceforth referred to simply as targets)
from unauthorized users. To achieve this goal, RBAC specifies and enforces different kinds
of constraints. Core RBAC defines the properties that must be present in any RBAC ap-
plication. Core RBAC requires that users be assigned to roles, roles be associated with
permissions (approval to perform an operation on a target), and that users acquire permis-
sions through their associated roles. For example, in a banking application, users can be
assigned to roles such as loan officer and teller, where a loan officer has permission to issue
loans to customers.
Sandhu et al. [77] have specified four conceptual RBAC models. Core RBAC (RBAC0)
is the most basic model. In core RBAC, a user can establish a session to activate a subset
of roles to which the user is assigned. Hierarchical RBAC (RBAC1) includes RBAC0 and
introduces role hierarchies. Hierarchies structure roles to reflect an organization’s lines of
authority and responsibility and they are specified using inheritance of roles. RBAC2 in-
cludes RBAC0 and introduces constraints to restrict the assignment of users or permissions
to roles, or the activation of roles in sessions. Constraints are used to specify application
dependent conditions, such as, separation of duties. RBAC3 combines both RBAC1 and
RBAC2, thus providing role hierarchies as well as constraints.
Core RBAC does not place any constraint on the cardinalities of the user-role assign-
ment relation or the permission-role association. In core RBAC each user can activate
multiple sessions; however, each session is associated with only one user. The operations
that a user can perform in a session depend on the roles activated in that session and the
permissions associated with those roles.
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Hierarchical RBAC adds role hierarchies to Core RBAC. Role hierarchies define inher-
itance relation among the roles in terms of permissions and user assignments. If role r1
inherits role r2 then all permissions of r2 are also permissions of r1 and all users of r1 are
also users of r2. There are no cardinality constraints on the inheritance relationship. The
inheritance relationship is reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric.
Static Separation of Duty (SSD) relations are used to define conflicting roles: If a user is
assigned to roles that conflict then there is a conflict of interest with respect to permissions
assigned to the user via the roles. SSD relations between roles constrain how users are
assigned to roles: Membership in one role that takes part in an SSD relation prevents the
user from being a member of the other role. The SSD relationship is symmetric, but it is
neither reflexive nor transitive. SSD relations may exist in the absence of role hierarchies
(referred to as SSD RBAC or RBAC2), or in the presence of role hierarchies (referred to
as hierarchical SSD RBAC or RBAC3). The presence of role hierarchies complicates the
enforcement of the SSD relations: Before assigning users to roles not only should one
check the direct user assignments but also the indirect user assignments that occur due to














Figure 3.1: Hierarchical SSD Role-Based Access Control (taken from [27])
Fig. 3.1 shows a model of hierarchical SSD RBAC that consists of: (1) a set of users
(USERS) where a user is an intelligent autonomous agent , (2) a set of roles (ROLES)
where a role is a job function , (3) a set of sessions (SESSIONS) where a user establishes
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a session during which he/she activates a subset of the roles assigned to him/her, (4) a set
of targets (T GT S), where a target is an entity that contains or receives information, (5)
a set of operations types (OPS) where an operation describes a service provided by the
application, and (6) a set of permissions (PRMS) where a permission is an approval to
perform an operation on targets. The cardinalities of the relationships are indicated by the
absence (denoting one) or presence of arrow heads (denoting many) on the corresponding
associations. For example, the association of user to session is one-to-many. All other
associations shown in the figure are many-to-many. The association labeled Role Hierarchy
defines the inheritance relationship among roles. The association labeled SSD specifies
conflicting roles.
3.4 Unified Modeling Language
The UML [90] is a widely-used standard modeling language for object-oriented systems
maintained by the Object Management Group (OMG) (see www.omg.org), a standards
body for the object-oriented community. The UML prescribes a standard set of diagrams
and notations for modeling object-oriented systems, and describes the underlying semantics
of what these diagrams and symbols mean. It began as a consolidation of the work of Grady
Booch, James Rumbaugh, and Ivar Jacobson, creators of the most popular object-oriented
methodologies. UML 1.0 was proposed by the UML Partners, a consortium of several
organizations, in 1997 in response to an OMG’s request for proposals for a standard object-
oriented analysis notation and semantic metamodel. Several revisions have been produced
since the UML 1.0, and the most recent work, version 2.0, was approved by the OMG in
2005 (refer to [90]).
UML 2.0 offers thirteen types of diagrams to model systems, including use case, activ-
ity, class, sequence, and statechart diagrams [90]. Each diagram describes a different view
of the system being modeled. Constraints on structure and behavior are stated using the
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Object Constraint Language (OCL) [91]. In this dissertation we use the following three
UML diagram types:
  Class Diagram: A diagram that describes classifiers and their relationships. Prop-
erties are specified in the form of invariants and operation pre- and postconditions
using the OCL [91].
  Sequence Diagram: A diagram that describes how instances interact to accomplish a
task.
  Activity Diagram: A diagram that describes the flow of control (and optionally data)













(a) A class diagram example (b) A sequence diagram example
op()
Figure 3.2: Class diagram and sequence diagram examples
Fig. 3.2 shows examples of a class diagram and a sequence diagram. A class diagram
describes classifiers (e.g., classes, interfaces, types) and their relationships. A class is a
classifier that characterizes a family of objects in terms of attributes and operations that
are common to the objects. An operation can be specified using pre- and postconditions
expressed in the OCL. Links between class objects are specified by associations between
classes. The ends of associations, referred to as association-ends in UML metamodel,
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have properties such as multiplicity and navigability. The class diagram in Fig. 3.2(a)
shows three classes A, B, and C, and their relationships. A class B has a generaliza-
tion/specialization relationship with a class C, which specifies that C inherits the features of
B. The association between A and B declares that there can be links between the instances
of A and B.
A sequence diagram describes how objects interact to accomplish a task [47]. An in-
teraction is expressed in terms of lifelines and messages. A lifeline is a participant in an
interaction. In this dissertation, messages represent operation calls. For example, the se-
quence diagram in Fig. 3.2(b) shows that a:A, a lifeline of a class A object, sends a message
to b:B, a lifeline of a class B object, to carry out a specific goal. The sequence diagram no-
tation can be used to specify alternative sets of interactions and iterations over interactions.
OCL expressions are used to formalize invariants for classes, preconditions and post-
conditions for operations. For example, we can add the following OCL expression to the








*          employer
employee          1
Figure 3.3: Another class diagram example
context Company inv:
self.numberOfEmployees  50
The above constraint defines an invariant of the class Company stating that the value of
an attribute numberOfEmployees must be greater than 50 in all consistent states of the
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system4. Each OCL expression is evaluated in the context of an instance of a specific type
and the reserved keyword self is used to refer to the instance. For example, self represents
an instance of the type Company in the above invariant. The attributes, association ends
and operations of an instance can be accessed using “.” (dot). In the above example,
self.numberOfEmployees denotes the attribute numberOfEmployees of the company.
Preconditions and postconditions are constraints that specify applicability and effect of
an operation without stating an algorithm or implementation [94]. The following constraint
can be added to the class Company shown in Fig. 3.3 as well:
context Company::isCurrentEmployee(p:Person):Boolean
pre: true
post: result = self.employee  includes(p)
In the above example, there is no precondition for this operation, so the constrain
always holds. For the postcondition, the object that is returned by the operation can be
referred to by the reserved keyword result. When the multiplicity of an association end is
grater than 1, a navigation results in a collection of objects. In our example expression, the
navigation from a company to associated employees results in a set of employee objects.
OCL has some built-in primitive types (e.g., Boolean, String, Integer) and collection types
(e.g., Set, Bag). Collections have many predefined operations on them (e.g., includes,
excludes, includesAll, excludesAll, isEmpty). To access this type of operations, an arrow
symbol is used in OCL instead of dot symbol. For example, the OCL type Set has the
operation includes of type Boolean that tests whether the object passed as a parameter is
an element of the collection. In our example expression, the operation isCurrentEmployee
4While the system is, for instance, executing an operation, it is not in a consistent state, and the invariant
need not be true. Of course, when the execution has finished, the invariant must again be true [91].
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checks whether the set of persons referenced by the association end employee contains a















Figure 3.4: UML four layer metamodel architecture
The UML infrastructure is defined as a four-layer architecture (see Figure 3.4).
  Level M3 (meta-metamodel layer) defines a language for specifying metamodels.
The Meta Object Facility (MOF) [58] is an example of meta-metamodel.
  Level M2 (metamodel layer) contains models that specify modeling languages. The
UML metamodel and the Common Warehouse Metamodel (CWM) [89] are exam-
ples of metamodels.
  Level M1 (model layer) contains models that describe semantic domains. The model
layer consists of models expressed in languages specified by the metamodel at level
M2 .
  Level M0 (instance layer) consists of actual instances (objects) of the running system
specified by the models at level M1.
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3.5 Aspect-Oriented Modeling (AOM)
In this section we give an overview of the AOM approach [31, 69] on which our work is
based. Aspect models in the AOM approach describe crosscutting features. A crosscutting
feature can be isolated if its distributed elements have common structural and behavioral
characteristics. A generalized form of the solution can then be represented as a pattern,
where the pattern describes common characteristics of the distributed solution parts. A
pattern view of crosscutting solutions screens out context-specific details and makes it pos-
sible to conceive, describe, and understand the solutions in isolation. In our AOM approach
an aspect model is a pattern that characterizes a family of features. The patterns are de-
scribed using UML model templates. UML model template notation is an adaptation of
a UML-based pattern language, called the Role-Based Metamodeling Language (RBML)
[30].
3.5.1 An Overview of the AOM Approach
The AOM approach utilizes the following items [31]:
1. A primary (base) model: The primary model describes the core functionality that
determines the dominant design structure. It is described using the Unified Modeling
Language (UML) [90].
2. A set of aspect models: Each aspect model describes a feature that crosscuts the
dominant structure described in the primary model. The crosscutting features are
described as patterns in aspect models.
3. A set of bindings: A binding associates an application-specific value to a template
parameter. Applying the bindings to an aspect model produces a context-specific
aspect model that describes how the feature is to be realized in the primary model.
4. A basic model merging procedure: A name-based procedure is used to merge a
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context-specific aspect and a primary model. Elements with the same name are
merged in the composed model.
5. A set of composition directives: Composition directives are used to help ensure that











Figure 3.5: An overview of composition in the AOM approach [84, 31]
Fig. 3.5 gives an overview of composition in the AOM approach [31, 84]. The first
step is to identify the bindings needed to generate a context-specific aspect. The context-
specific aspect model is then composed with the primary model to produce a composed
model. Composition directives are often needed to ensure that composition produces re-
quired results [73, 86]. They can be used to (1) determine the order in which multiple
aspects are composed with the primary model, (2) modify models before they are merged,
(3) override specific parts of the basic merge procedure, and (4) modify the model produced
by the basic merge procedure.
3.5.2 Representing Aspect Models
Aspect models can be represented as UML diagram templates representing patterns of fea-
tures. The diagram templates used in this dissertation produce UML design diagrams when
instantiated. In the UML, template models are described by parameterized packages that
explicitly list the parameters in the package header. However, this notation is unwieldy
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when a large number of parameters are involved. France et al. [30] and Kim [47] devel-
oped a specialized form of the Role-Based MetaModeling Language (RBML) to describe
aspect models. RBML is a UML based language that supports rigorous specification of pat-
tern solutions. The specialized RBML is used to create RBML models consisting of a set of
diagram templates and OCL templates. Aspect models consist of class diagram templates
and sequence diagram templates. Since RBML uses UML syntax, UML tools can be used
to create RBML models. The aspect model consists of two diagram templates: A class di-
agram template that describes structural properties of the features and a sequence diagram
template that describes interactions among feature elements. Class diagram templates and
sequence diagram templates have template model elements that are explicitly marked us-
ing the “  ” symbol. A class template consists of two parts: one part consists of attribute
templates that produce attributes when instantiated, and the other part consists of operation
templates that produce operations when instantiated. Operation templates may be associ-
ated with template forms of pre- and postconditions, referred to as operation specification
templates, that produce OCL specifications when instantiated. These operation specifica-
tion templates are presented separately from the diagrams to reduce diagram clutter. For
example, Fig. 3.6 shows an aspect model, Authorization, characterizing features in which
access to a service is restricted to authorized clients.
Instantiating the class diagram template shown in Fig. 3.6(a) results in a class dia-
gram that consists of composite classes representing logical architectural views of clients,
servers with services under access control, and authorization repositories. The class tem-
plate Server contains an attribute template with a name parameter (i.e., name) and two
operation templates (i.e., operationi and doOperation). A service under access control is
represented by these two operations in a server class:
  An operation that checks whether a client that requests the service is authorized to
execute the service. The operation signature is obtained by instantiating the opera-
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(a) Class Diagram Template for an Authorization Aspect Model


















result = |checkAuth(q:|id, op:|OpType, |params*)
|p
|name: String
Figure 3.6: An Authorization-based Access Control Aspect Model (taken from [31] and
modified)
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(represented by the operation argument template id :  id) and zero or more values
needed by the service (represented by the argument template  params  ). The tem-
plate parameter params  is referred to as a collection parameter indicating that it
must be bound to a collection of values.
  An operation that performs the required service. This operation is obtained by in-
stantiating the operation template  doOperation. The use of the  params  collection
parameter in both the operation and doOperation templates indicates that the same
value (i.e., the same set of arguments) must be used to instantiate the collection pa-
rameter in both of the templates.
The class template AuthorizationRepository contains the operation template  checkAuth
that produces an operation that performs authorization checks when instantiated. A
 checkAuth operation uses the client identifier (represented by q :  id), an operation
identifier (represented by op : OpType), and possibly other information passed in as
arguments (represented by the collection parameter  params  ), to determine whether the
client is authorized to access the operation or not. If the client is authorized the operation
returns a value that is an instantiation of  valid, otherwise it returns a value that is an
instantiation of  invalid. The following is the annotated operation specification template
associated with the  operation template:
context Server::  operation(id:  id,  params*)
pre: true
 This operation can be invoked at any time.
post:
 The service is carried out if and only if the client is
 authorized to invoke the service.
let authmessage : OclMessage =
34
AuthorizationRepositoryˆ  checkAuth(q:  id,op:  opType,  params*)
in
(authmessage.hasReturned() and authmessage.result() = true
implies  Serverˆ  doOperation(params*)) and
( Serverˆ  doOperation(params*) implies
authmessage.hasReturned() and authmessage.result() = true)
An association template consists of multiplicity parameters (one at each end) that yield
association multiplicities (integer ranges) when instantiated. The multiplicity in an alpha-
bet letter (e.g., “a” on the Session end of the UserSessions template) is an unconstrained
multiplicity parameter, that is, any integer range of multiplicity (e.g., “1..*”, “*”, “1..4”)
can be instantiated from it.
The sequence diagram template shown in Fig. 3.6(b) consists of template forms of
participants (i.e., : Client, :  Server, and : AuthorizationRepository) and messages (e.g.,
 operation   id  params  ). Instantiating a participant template produces either a named
or anonymous participant, for example, binding UserMgmt to the parameter Server in
the :  Server participant template produces the anonymous participant : UserMgmt. In a
participant template, the type parameter (e.g.,  Server in :  Server) must be a classifier
template in a corresponding classifier diagram template. Participant type parameters and
the corresponding classifier templates must be instantiated with the same value.
Message templates consist of parameterized message expressions. For example, a mes-
sage template result :=  checkAuth(q:  id,op:  opType,  params*) is a parameterized message
expression that includes three mandatory parameters checkAuth, id, and opType, and an
optional set of arguments indicated by the collection parameter params  . The message
expression result :  IDcheck  q : Userid  op : U pdateOp  userstatus : Status  usersession :
Session  can be obtained from this template using the following bindings: IDcheck
 checkAuth, Userid  id, U pdateOp  opType, and  (userstatus  params),
35
(usersession  params)  .
For readability, we do not show the template parameter indicator symbol “  ” in the
following chapters of this dissertation. In such cases, all the user-defined names in the di-
agram are template parameters that must be bound to values when instantiating the aspect
model. For example, the following values are examples of ones that are not template pa-
rameters: UML keywords such as Boolean and enumeration, UML stereo-typed name such
as prohibited, OCL keywords such as self and includesAll, and all variable names.
In this dissertation aspect models specified using UML diagram template notation are
defined at the M2 (matemodel layer) level since aspect models are generic descriptions of
model families. The context-specific aspect models and primary model are defined at the
M1 (model layer) level.
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Chapter 4
Enforcing an Access Control Policy in an
Aspect Model
From a software design perspective, access control policies are requirements that must be
addressed in a design. For example, access control policies are constraints that determine
the type of access authorized users have on information resources. In this chapter, we
show how one can formulate access control policies as a policy model, formulate an access
control aspect model that enforces policies as an aspect, and verify whether the aspect
model enforces the given policies or not. We show two access control policy examples,
RBAC and BLP.
4.1 Formulating Access Control Policies
Policies are expressed in terms of UML class diagrams with OCL constraints. We define
this form of diagrams with constraints as a policy model. A policy model is obtained by
analyzing the given policy statement as illustrated in Fig. 4.1. For example, the following
shows how the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) policy can be expressed in a policy
model. We use the Proposed NIST standard for role-based access control [27] as RBAC
requirements. The access control policy statement must describe under what condition
a user does or does not have permission to access a target to perform a certain type of







Figure 4.1: Obtaining a policy model from requirements
PRBAC  1: If a user u has permission to access a target t to perform operations of type op in
a session s, then there exists a role r with the following properties:
  r has permission to access t to perform operations of type op,
  r is an authorized role for u, and
  r is currently activated in s.
PRBAC  2: Roles activated in a session must be a subset of the roles assigned to the user of
the session.























Figure 4.2: An RBAC policy model
User class and Session class in the policy model represent a set of users and a set of sessions
respectively. The Role class in the policy model represents a set of roles that a user can play.
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The Permission class in the policy model represents pairs of sets where one part of a pair is
a set of Target instances and the other is a set of OperationType instances.
To formally specify the first part of the policy statement, PRBAC  1, we define the derived
hasPermission relationship between Session and Permission that links sessions with their
permissions as stated in the RBAC policy PRBAC  1. The OCL statements that define the
RBAC policy PRBAC  1 are given below:
PRBAC  1:
context Session inv:
hasPermission  forAll(p:Permission 
activatedRole  exists(r  r.allowedPermission  includes(p)) and
sessionUser.authorizedRole  exists(r  r.allowedPermission  includes(p)))
where a derived association hasPermission is defined as follows:
context Session:: hasPermission : Set(Permission)
derive: activatedRole.allowedPermission




These two policy properties must be true in the model that enforces the RBAC policy.
The policy model described above is used for showing the policy enforcement that will be
described later in Section 4.3.
As another example, we show the case of BLP model. The BLP policy can be expressed
as follows:
PBLP  1: If a user u has permission to read from or write to a target t in a subject s by
performing an operation of type op, then all of the following are satisfied:
  op is a read type and the security level of s dominates the security level of t, or
op is a write type and the security level of s is equal to the security level of t,
  s is a subject for u and the security level of u dominates the security level of s
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PBLP  2: the security level of a BLP subject must be dominated by the security level of its
user





















Figure 4.3: A BLP policy model
The following OCL statements expresses the BLP policies PBLP  1 and PBLP  2:
PBLP  1:
context Subject inv:
hasPermission  forAll(t:Target 
t.targetOperation  forAll(op:OperationType 
((op.Type = TypeEnum::READ and
subjectSecurityLevel.dominatees  includes(t.targetSecurityLevel))
or







These two BLP policy properties must be satisfied in the aspect model that enforces
the BLP policy.
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4.2 Formulating Access Control Models As Aspect Mod-
els
Fig. 4.4 shows the class diagram template of the hierarchical SSD RBAC aspect model
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Figure 4.4: The class model template view of the RBAC aspect model
aspect model consists of a set of users, a set of roles, a set of user sessions, a set of targets,
a set of operation types, and a set of permissions as described earlier in Section 3.3. Users
are assigned to roles, roles are associated with permissions, and users acquire permissions
by being members of roles. Association templates, such as UserAssignment and User-
Sessions produce associations between instantiations of the class templates they connect.
The multiplicity “1” on the User end of the UserSessions template is strict: a session can
only be associated with one user. Only roles that are assigned to the user of a session can
be activated for that user in the same session. The following invariant shown in Fig. 4.4




The operations that a user can perform in a session depend on the roles activated in that
session and the permissions associated with those roles. The operation template Operation
in the Session template represents operations under access control. Instantiating Operation
produces an operation that describes a behavior that is performed on target elements (e.g.,
a withdraw operation on an account element in a banking system). The class template
OperationType contains an attribute template with a type parameter (Type). Instances
of Type may be any of the user-defined enumeration literals instantiated from OpType
which is an attribute template of the enumeration template OpTypeEnum. Table 4.1 gives
an overview of operation templates in each class template shown in Fig. 4.4.
All the user-defined names1 in the diagram are template parameters that must be bound
to values when instantiating the aspect model. Note that we used the symbol “  ” to indi-
cate template parameters in Section 3.5. From this chapter, however, we do not show the
template parameter indicator symbol “  ” for the readability. For example, the parameter
template params in the Operation template shown in Session of Fig. 4.4 must be bound to
a list of zero or more operation arguments as indicated by the “  ” following the parameter
name.
An instantiation of Operation can have one or more arguments representing target ele-
ments (t:Target 1..*) and zero or more other arguments (params *). For example, the opera-
tion transfer (from:Account, to:Account, amount:Integer) can be obtained from Operation
using the following bindings for template parameters:  trans f er  Operation, Account
 Target, amount : Integer  params  , where (value  parameter) represents a binding
1In Fig. 4.4, for example, the following values are examples of ones that are not template parameters:
UML keywords such as Boolean, String, Set, and enumeration, OCL keywords such as self and includesAll ,
and all variable names such as s for a Session object, t for a Target object.
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that is done by providing a value for a parameter. More detailed specification of Operation
and its instantiation examples will be described later in Chapter 6. Table 4.1 gives an
overview of operation templates in each class template.
The CheckAccess operation template in Session is intended to enforce the RBAC policy




self.GetAllActiveRoles().Permission  exists (p 
p.Target  includes(t) and p.OperationType  includes(op))
The postcondition of CheckAccess states the following: If there exists an activated role
with the required permission, the CheckAccess operation returns true, otherwise it returns
false.
The behavior described by CheckAccess is called whenever an operation under access
control (represented by Operation) is invoked. When the behavior described by Operation
is invoked it first checks whether the caller has permission to perform the operation on the
target objects (the set of targets represented by the parameter t in the Operation template)
by invoking the behavior described by CheckAccess for each target object. Invariants and
operation specifications associated with other elements in the RBAC aspect model are given
in the Appendix A.
Fig. 4.5 shows the class diagram template of the BLP aspect model. Access control
policies in BLP are specified in terms of dominance relation between security levels of
a subject and an object. The dominance relation between security levels in BLP (e.g.,
L

S  dominates L  O  ) is expressed in terms of the query operations GetAllDominatees
and GetAllDominators. AddDominatee in SecurityLevel adds a link between the current
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Table 4.1: The list of operation templates defined in RBAC.
Operation Template Description
User Class Template
CreateSession creates a new session and activates a default role set; creates a
UserSession link between the user and the session
DeleteSession deactivates roles that are activated in the given session and deletes
that session; deletes a UserSession link
AssignRole creates a UserAssignment link between the user and the given role
DeassignRole deletes a UserAssignment link
GetAssignedRoles returns the set of roles directly assigned to the user as well as those
roles that are inherited by the directly assigned roles
GetAuthorizedRoles returns the set of roles directly assigned to the user as well as those
roles that are inherited by the directly assigned roles (junior roles)
Session Class Template
AddActiveRole creates a new SessionRole link between the session and the role that
is one of roles in the authorized role set.
DropActivatedRole deletes a SessionRole link between the session and the given role.
GetAllActiveRoles returns a set of all roles which are activated for that session and all
their junior roles
CheckAccess determines whether an access should be granted or not
Operation invokes the operation under access control if the caller has
permission to each target
Role Class Template
GrantPemission creates a new PermAssignment link between the role and the given
RevokePemission permission deletes a new PermAssignment link
AddInheritance adds a link RoleHierarchy to a senior role
DeleteInheritance deletes a link RoleHierarchy to a senior role
AddSSDRole creates a new SSD link between roles
DeleteSSDRole deletes an SSD link
GetAllJuniors returns a set of roles which consists of direct junior roles and all
other junior roles acquired by the transitive closure relation in a
role hierarchy
GetAllSeniors returns a set of roles which consists of direct senior roles and all
other senior roles acquired by the transitive closure relation in a
role hierarchy
GetAuthorizedUsers returns the set of users that are assigned to the role and its senior
CheckAccess roles determines whether an access should be granted or not
Permission Class Template










































Figure 4.5: The class model template view of the BLP aspect model
security level (dominator) and the given security level (indicated by the operation parameter
sl), and CreateSub ject in User creates a subject with a given security level sl. According to
the invariant associated with Sub ject (see Fig. 4.5), a new subject can be created when the
security of the user dominates the security level of the subject to be created. This constraint
is checked in the precondition of CreateSub ject.
The access control privileges are enforced by making all operations under access con-
trol invoke the CheckAccess operation in a session. If the operation is a write operation and
the security level of the target is equal to the security level of the subject, the CheckAccess
operation returns true; if the operation is a read operation and the security level of the target
is equal to or dominated by the security level of the subject, the CheckAccess operation also
returns true; otherwise the CheckAccess operation returns false. The specification template





t.OperationType  includes (op)
and
((op.Type = OperationType::READ and
self.SecurityLevel.GetAllDominatees()  includes (t.SecurityLevel))
or
(op.Type = OperationType::WRITE and
self.SecurityLevel = t.SecurityLevel))
Specification templates for the other operations and specification templates describing other
invariant properties of BLP elements are given in the appendix B Appendix B.
4.3 Verifying Policy Enforcement
In this section, we illustrate how one can apply our approach to verifying the policy en-
forcement of an aspect model using RBAC and BLP aspect model examples. Fig. 4.6
shows the policy enforcement verification process we developed.
policy model and aspect model : These models are two inputs to the verification process.
Note that an aspect model is a generic description of model families and it is specified
using UML diagram template notation while a policy model is stated in terms of
UML class diagram concepts with constraints that express restrictions given in a
policy statement. 2
realization mapping rules : To verify that an aspect model describing an access control
2In other words, an aspect model in this dissertation is defined at the M2 (metamodel) level of the four
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Transform policy model 
Figure 4.6: Verifying a design aspect model against its policy model.
feature enforces targeted access control policies, we define realization mapping rules.
A realization mapping in our approach is a set of pairs that defines how elements in
the policy model are realized in the generalized aspect model. These mapping rules
are used to transform the OCL invariants in the policy model into invariants expressed
in terms of aspect model concepts.
the most general context-specific aspect model : We obtain a context-specific aspect
model that is described at the M1 level so that OCL transformations can be per-
formed between two M1-level models (i.e., one is a policy model and the other is a
context-specific aspect model). Note that a context-specific aspect model is obtained
by providing one or more domain-specific parameter values for each parameter in
an aspect model (refer to Fig. 3.5). For example, for a banking application domain,
BankSession and BankRole can be provided for the class templates Session and Role
in Fig. 4.4 respectively. Since no domain-specific value set is available yet, we ob-
tain the most general context-specific aspect model of an aspect model by providing
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a general set of parameter values for its template parameters as described below:
  provide a current parameter name as a parameter value for each template (e.g.,
class, attribute, operation, association templates) except multiplicity parameters
on ends of association templates.
  provide a multiplicity indicator “  ” that represents “zero or more” for each
multiplicity template in an alphabet letter (i.e., the weakest form of multiplicity
for an unconstrained multiplicity parameter).
transformed policy model invariants : Using realization mapping rules, invariants of an
policy model are transformed into invariants expressed in terms of aspect model con-
cepts.
enforcement verification : Verifying that the aspect model enforces the policy model in-
volves establishing that transformed invariants hold in the aspect model.
When an RBAC policy model in Fig. 4.2 and an RBAC aspect model in Fig. 4.4, for
example, are given as inputs to our verification procedure, realization mapping rules are
defined in the form of set of realization pairs. A realization pair can be defined explicitly
or implicitly. An explicit pair has the form  policyElem, aspectElem  , indicating that
the policy model element policyElem is realized by an element aspectElem in the aspect
model. The explicit realization pairs used in the verification of the RBAC aspect model
reflect the simple one-to-one relationship between the major concepts shown in the policy
model and the aspect model.
The following shows explicitly defined in realization pairs in the RBAC realization
mapping:
 Session, Session  ,  User, User  ,  Role, Role  ,  Permission, Permission  ,
 Target, Target  ,  OperationType, OperationType  .
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In the implicit form, one or both items in the pair are expressions that are evaluated.
For example, the following is the realization pair that describes how the UserSession
association in the RBAC policy model is realized in the aspect model:
 u:User.userSession, u:User.UserSession  .
In the above u:User.userSession represents the set of session objects associated with a
user u in the policy model, and u:User.UserSession represents the set of sessions associated
with the realization of u in the RBAC aspect model.
The following are implicitly defined in realization pairs in the RBAC realization map-
ping:
 u:User.authorizedRole, u:User.GetAuthorizedRoles()  ,
 r:Role.allowedPermission, r:Role.Permission  ,
 s:Session.sessionUser, s:Session.UserSession  ,
 s:Session.activatedRole, s:Session.GetAllActivatedRoles()  ,
 p:Permission.allowedTarget, p:Permission.Target  ,
 p:Permission.allowedOp, p:Permission.OperationType  .
The permissions associated with a session via the hasPermision association end in
the policy model, is realized by the set of permissions associated with roles activated in
a session. If we model the relationship between permissions and sessions in the RBAC
aspect model as a derived association between Session and Permission that is named
SPermission, then the following realization pair maps hasPermission links to SPermission
links:  s:Session.hasPermission, s:Session.SPermission  .
Fig. 4.7 shows the most general context-specific RBAC class model that is obtained
from the RBAC aspect model given in Fig. 4.4. Session and Role, for example, are pro-
vided as parameter values to instantiate the class templates Session and Role respectively
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Figure 4.7: The most general context-specific RBAC aspect model
Therefore, the most general context-specific RBAC aspect model has an operation named
CheckAccess in a class Session. For each multiplicity parameter expressed in an alpha-
bet letter (e.g., the multiplicity parameter a on Session end of UserSession association of
Fig. 4.4), we provide the multiplicity indicator “  ”.
Using realization mappings shown above, the RBAC policy constraints PRBAC  1 and
PRBAC  2 are transformed to the following:
PRBAC  1  trans f ormed:
context Session inv:
SPermission  forAll(p:Permission 
GetAllActiveRoles()  exists(r  r.Permission  includes(p)) and
UserSession.GetAuthorizedRoles()  exists(r  r.Permission  includes(p)))
where a derived association SPermission is defined as follows:
context Session:: SPermission : Set(Permission)
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derive: self.GetAllActiveRoles().Permission
PRBAC  2  trans f ormed:
context Session inv:
UserSession.GetAuthorizedRoles()  includesAll(GetAllActivatedRoles())
The behavior described by the CheckAccess template must enforce the transformed
RBAC policy properties, PRBAC  1  trans f ormed and PRBAC  2  trans f ormed . We show the policy
enforcement below:
  From the definition of SPermission, if there is a permission in the set of permissions
represented by SPermission that grants the access, an invocation of a CheckAccess
operation with an argument t representing the target operation and an argument op
representing the operation type, must return true; otherwise it returns false.
  Note that s CheckAccess  t  op  true when the following expression in the postcon-
dition of CheckAccess is true:
self.GetAllActiveRoles().Permission  exists (p 
p.Target  includes(t) and p.OperationType  includes(op))
  PRBAC  2  trans f ormed holds because of the invariant shown in Fig. 4.7.
  Showing that PRBAC  2  trans f ormed holds in the RBAC aspect model requires one to
show that the following expression is true for all permissions in the set of permissions
represented by SPermission (i.e., permissions that grant the access):
GetAllActiveRoles()  exists(r  r.Permission  includes(p))   1 
and
UserSession.GetAuthorizedRoles()  exists(r  r.Permission  includes(p))   2 
The postcondition of CheckAccess must return true for each permission p that grants
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the access. Therefore, the following expression holds:
GetAllActiveRoles().Permission  exists(p)   3 
which is equivalent to






3  and PRBAC  2  trans f ormed , we know the following expression
holds:
UserSession.GetAuthorizedRoles().Permission  exists(p)
which is equivalent to




  Therefore, two transformed RBAC policy properties, PRBAC  1  trans f ormed and
PRBAC  2  trans f ormed , holds in RBAC aspect model.
Verifying the BLP aspect model against its policy model proceeds as described for
RBAC. We do not show the details of this verification because it uses techniques already
covered in our discussion on verifying the RBAC aspect model.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have given an AOM approach to modeling access control features that
enforce access control policies separately as aspects and checking whether modeled aspects
enforces given policies. To check that an aspect model enforces expected access control
policies, access control policies need to be translated into the forms that access control
aspects are specified in. In our approach, we propose to create a policy model that is
a set of policies stated in terms of UML class diagram concepts with constraints and to
obtain a context-specific aspect model that is the most general form of instantiation from
the aspect model. The realization relationships between an aspect model and a policy model
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are described in the form of realization mapping rules. Using these rules, we transform the
OCL invariants in the policy model to invariants expressed in terms of concepts in a general
context-specific aspect model and verify the required policy enforcement by establishing
that transformed invariants hold in the given aspect model.
As examples of access control policies, RBAC and BLP policy requirements were rep-
resented by RBAC policy model and BLP policy model respectively and an RBAC aspect
model and a BLP aspect model were formulated. As a verification example, the RBAC
aspect model was verified against RBAC policies given in [27].
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Chapter 5
Composing Access Control Aspect
Models: An Example
Complex applications typically must enforce more than on access control policies. In AOM
approach, each aspect model is typically applied to a primary model sequentially, that is,
one at a time. Another approach is to compose multiple aspect models with a primary
model that addresses the drawbacks of the sequential approach. In the approach the aspect
models are composed to produce a single hybrid aspect model. This hybrid aspect model
can then be composed with a primary model to produce a design that enforces the integrated
set of policies. Fig. 5.1, for example, illustrates two approaches to composing multiple
aspect models with a primary model.
In the approach illustrated in Fig. 5.1(a) each aspect model is instantiated to obtain a
corresponding context-specific aspect model. The context-specific models are composed
one at a time with the primary model. This approach has the following drawbacks:
  It is difficult to understand and analyze the interactions between the aspects indepen-
dently of the primary model.
  The approach does not allow one to leverage commonalities in how aspects are com-
posed when the same set of aspects are composed with more than one primary model.
In the approach shown in Fig. 5.1(b) two aspect models are first composed to obtain
a composed aspect model, which is a hybrid access control (HAC) aspect model that de-
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Figure 5.1: Two approaches to incorporating access control aspects into a primary model
scribes the integration of two access control features. The HAC aspect model is then in-
stantiated, and the resulting context-specific aspect model is composed with the primary
model. The approach illustrated in Fig. 5.1(b) has the following advantages over the ap-
proach shown in Fig. 5.1(a):
  The HAC aspect is specified separately from the application which makes under-
standing and analyzing the HAC easier.
  The HAC aspect can be reused across a number of different applications reducing
the time and effort needed to perform the composition. If two aspects are to be
composed with n primary models, then the approach shown in Fig. 5.1(a) requires
the composition process to be applied 2  n times. The approach shown in Fig. 5.1(b)
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requires the composition process to be applied n  1 times: one for the composition
of the aspect models and n for compositions of the composed aspect model and the
primary models.
The aspect composition approach illustrated in Fig. 5.1(b) supports understanding and
analyzing the aspects in isolation. Such analysis can help determine whether the right
combination of aspects was selected before the aspects are composed with a primary model.
For example, consider a situation in which a software design that addresses auditing and
access control concerns is needed. There are a number of alternative features that address
these concerns and a pairing of an auditing feature with an access control feature may
produce undesirable emergent behavior (e.g., auditing may provide access to information
that is under access control). It helps if the interactions across the access control and
auditing features can be analyzed and understood before the features are composed with
the primary model.
The approach also leverages commonalities to reduce the number of composition steps
needed to compose the aspects with multiple primary models: Instead of carrying out mul-
tiple sequential compositions one only has to compose the composed aspect with a primary
model (the composition of aspects is done only once, and the result is used across multiple
primary models). The reduction in time and effort is significant when the composed aspect
is used in many different applications. We illustrate our approach by composing two access
control features: a feature that realizes the Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model [79] and a feature
that realizes the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model [27]. The composed aspect can
be used to develop designs that must enforce both BLP and RBAC policies (e.g., designs
of applications in the military domain).
5.1 Overview
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Figure 5.2: An aspect composition approach
composition approach proceeds as follows:
1. Verify enforcement of policies in aspect models (refer to Chapter 4) : The first step
is to verify that each individual aspect models to be composed enforces the given pol-
icy. We use refinement techniques that are adapted to the UML class model for this
purpose. From the verification, a modeler obtains the knowledge of the relationships
between original policies and the integrated policy that the composed aspect model
must enforce.
2. Select composition directives : The composition directives are selected by a modeler
using the knowledge of how the policies enforced by the aspect models can be com-
bined to obtain policies that must be enforced by the composed aspect model. A
model specify and use composition directives to ensure that composition produces
required results. We do not discuss how such knowledge is obtained (it can be based
on human expertise); we show only how the knowledge is utilized to select appropri-
ate composition directives.
3. Compose aspect models : The aspect models are composed using the composition di-
rectives selected in the previous step. A more detailed view of the composition pro-
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cess is presented in the next section.
5.2 Aspect Compositions
Our aspect composition approach is based on the procedure that we described earlier for
composing UML models [31, 72]. The composition procedure consists of a basic merging
procedure that implements default rules for merging model elements and the use of com-
position directives. The composition directives are used for overriding the default rules and
modifying models before and after basic model merging. In order to use the composition
procedure we treat aspect models as UML models. This is done by syntactically treating
the parameters in the aspect models as model element names. From a semantic viewpoint,
the result of composing two aspect models is not a UML model but an aspect model that
must be instantiated before it can be merged with a UML model.
We first present the basic merging procedure used to merge aspect models and give
examples of composition directives that can be used in conjunction with the basic procedure
to vary how models are composed.
5.2.1 The Basic Merging Procedure
The aspect composition approach uses a name-based matching procedure in which ele-
ments with the same name are merged in the composed model [31, 72] One model is con-
sidered to be the dominant model for the purpose of resolving problems that can arise
when merging matching model elements with conflicting properties. Model elements in
the dominant model are referred to as dominant model elements. In the cases where name-
based merging of property values leads to conflicts the default is to have the properties of
the dominant model element override the properties of the matching model element in the
non-dominant model. For example, if the isAbstract property of a class named C in the
dominant model has the value true and the property has the value f alse for a similarly
named class in the non-dominant model, then the composed model will contain the class C
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with the value true. Composition directives can be used to change the results produced by
the default name-based merge procedure.
The basic merging procedure and examples of default merging rules associated with
model element types are given below (aspect models are simply referred to as models in
the following).
Algorithm 1 Basic Model Merging Procedure
Step 1 For each model element in the dominant model, search for a model element in
the non-dominant model with the same name. Elements with matching names are
assumed to represent different views of the same concept and thus are intended to be
merged.
Step 2a If a matching element is found then it is merged according to default merging rules
associated with the model element type.
Step 2b If a matching element is not found then the dominant model element is included
in the composed model.
Step 3 Elements in the non-dominant model that are not matched with elements in the
dominant model are included in the composed model.
In the following we outline some of the rules for merging class model elements.
Algorithm 2 Default Rules for Merging Matching Classes
Rule 1 If the values associated with Class attributes (i.e., attributes of Class in the UML
metamodel, for example, isAbstract) are different then the default rule is to use the
value in the dominant model. This rule can be overridden by composition directives.
Rule 2 Attributes of matching classes with identical names and data types are merged. If
the matching attributes are associated with OCL invariants, the conjunction of the
invariants is associated with the merged attribute in the composed model. This rule
can be changed using composition directives.
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Rule 3 Operations with identical names are merged. If matching operations have different
argument lists, the merged operation in the composed model will have a list of argu-
ments formed by appending the list of arguments in the non-dominant model to the
list of arguments in the dominant model. If the matching operations are associated
with OCL specifications, then the specification associated with the merged operation
in the composed model is formed as follows: the precondition is the disjunction of
the preconditions associated with the matching operations, and the postcondition is
the conjunction of the postconditions associated with the matching operations.
Algorithm 3 Default Rules for Merging Associations
Rule 1 Association ends match when they have the same role end name. Alternatively,
two associations match when they have the same name (we require that associations
have either association names or role names at each end - if they have both, the role
names are used to determine matches).
Rule 2 If matching association ends have different multiplicities, then the multiplicity in
the dominant model is used.
These rules can be overridden by composition directives.
5.2.2 Composition Directives
Use of the basic name-based merging procedure is not likely to produce desired results in
all cases. Composition directives can be used in conjunction with the merging procedure
to ensure that desired models are produced [86]. Composition directives can be broadly
classified as follows:
Pre-Merge Directives: These directives are used to modify models before they are merged
by the basic merging procedure. These directives define transformations on the mod-
els that are to be composed.
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Merge Override Directives: These directives are used to override the default merging
rules.
Post-Merge Directives : These directives are used to modify the model that is produced by
the basic merge procedure. These directives define transformations on the composed
model.
Below we summarize the directives used in this work:
Table 5.1: A partial list of composition directives
Name Description Syntactic Form
(Directive Type)
rename A model element is renamed rename owner::targetElement
(Pre-Merge) to the given new name and to newName
all occurrences of the old name
are changed to the new name.
strengthenPreSpec The default rule for merging strengthenPreSpec in merging
(Merge Override) preconditions of operations, Aspect1::Class1::Operation1
disjunction of preconditions, and Aspect2::Class1::Operation1
is overridden by conjunction
of preconditions.
CreateAssociation An association is created newAssociation = CreateAssociation 
(Post-Merge) between two existing classes. name = “newAssociation”,
Note that each isDerived = true  false,
association end must be created memberEnd =
prior to creating an association. [newAssocEnd1, newAssocEnd2] 
The created association is not
a member of any namespace yet.
CreateProperty An association end is newAssocEnd1 = CreateProperty 
(Post-Merge) created. isComposite = true  false,
The created association end is not aggregation = none  composite,
a member of any namespace yet. type = aspect1::class1,
opposite = newAssocEnd2,
lower = non negative integer,
upper = non negative integer  ’*’ 
add The given model element is added add owner::elem
(Post-Merge) to the specified owner namespace.
replacePreSpec The precondition of operation replacePreSpec
(Post-Merge) is replaced by the given Class1::Operation1
OCL expression. with  ocl expression 
Continued on next page
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Table 5.1 – continued from previous page
Name Description Syntactic Form
replacePostSpec The postcondition of operation replacePostSpec
(Post-Merge) is replaced by the given Class1::Operation1
OCL expression. with  ocl expression 
addPreSpec The given OCL expression is addPreSpec  ocl expression 
(Post-Merge) added to the operation to Class1::Operation1
precondition by conjunction.
addPostSpec The given OCL expression is addPostSpec  ocl expression 
(Post-Merge) added to the operation to Class1::Operation1
postcondition by conjunction.
In the following section, we present the HAC policies and show how they are used to
determine the composition directives that are needed to ensure that composition produces
a HAC model that enforces the policies.
5.3 An Example of Composing RBAC and BLP Aspect
Models
To compose the RBAC model and the BLP model, one first determines the model elements
that represent the same concepts across the two models. These model elements must have
the same name in both models if they are to be merged using the basic merging procedure.
If model elements representing the same concept have different names then the rename
directive is used to rename one or both of the model elements so that they have the same
name. The rename directive is also used to change the name of a model element that has
the same name as another model element that represents a different concept. In the BLP
and RBAC aspect models, Sub ject and Session represent the same concept [76]. The
rename directive is used to rename Sub ject to Session and to change all occurrences of the
name Sub ject to Session in the BLP model. Also, the CreateSub ject and DeleteSub ject
operations in User and the UserSub ject association are renamed to CreateSession,
DeleteSession, and UserSession respectively. The following rename directives rename
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identified model elements accordingly:
rename BLP::Subject to Session
rename BLP::User::CreateSubject to CreateSession
rename BLP::User::DeleteSubject to DeleteSession
rename BLP::UserSubject to UserSession
These rename directives are pre-merge directives and thus are applied before applying the
basic merge procedure.
In the HAC aspect model the CreateSession precondition must be the conjunction of
the preconditions associated with CreateSession in both the RBAC and renamed BLP
models. The default rule is to form the disjunction and thus a composition directive is
needed to override the rule. The merge override directive strengthenPreSpec is used for
this purpose, as shown below:
strengthenPreSpec in merging RBAC::User::CreateSession
and BLP::User::CreateSession
The other composition directives needed to produce the required HAC aspect model are
identified by examining the policies that must be enforced by the HAC aspect model. These
directives are applied after the RBAC and renamed BLP aspect models are merged using
the basic merging procedure (i.e., they are post-merge directives). We refer to the model
produced using the basic merge procedure as the preliminary HAC aspect model. The post-
merge directives add an association to the composed aspect model and replace operation
specifications in the preliminary HAC aspect model with specifications that enforce the
required HAC policies.
The HAC policies given below are obtained from the RBAC and BLP policies:
PHAC :
PRBAC  1 : If a user u has permission to access a target t to perform an operation
63
with an operation type op in a session s, then there exists a role r such that r
has permission to access t to perform an operation with a type of op, r is an
authorized role for u, and r is currently activated in s (a property enforced by
CheckAccess of RBAC).
PRBAC  2 : Roles activated in a session s must be a subset of the roles assigned to the
user u of s.
PBLP  1  Read : If a user u has permission to read from a target t in a subject sb, then
the type of an operation op is a read type and the security level of sb dominates
the security level of t (a property enforced by CheckAccess of BLP).
PBLP  1  Write : If a user u has permission to write to a target t in a subject sb, then
the type of an operation op is a write type and the security level of sb is equal
to the security level of t (a property enforced by CheckAccess of BLP).
PBLP  2 : If a user u has permission to access a target t to perform an operation
with an operation type op in a subject sb, then sb is a subject for u and the
security level of u dominates the security level of sb (a property enforced by
CheckAccess of BLP).
PRole  User : The security level of u must dominate the security level of the role that
was assigned to u (role assignment is handled by AssignRole of RBAC).
PRole  Session : The security level of s must be equal to the security level of the
role that was activated for s (role activation is handled by CreateSession and
AddActiveRole of RBAC).
The first five policies given above, PRBAC  1, PRBAC  2, PBLP  1  Read , PBLP  1  W rite, and
PBLP  2, are enforced by the CheckAccess operations in RBAC and BLP. The HAC will
also have a CheckAccess operation that enforces its policies. This operation can be ob-
tained by merging the CheckAccess operations of both RBAC and BLP such that the de-
sired policies are enforced. Applying the default operation merge rules results in the de-
sired argument list and thus a composition directive is not needed to modify the argument
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list. The default operation rules though do not provide the needed operation specifica-
tion for HAC’s CheckAccess. The postcondition of RBAC’s CheckAccess has the form

result  PRBAC  1andPRBAC  2  and the postcondition of BLP’s CheckAccess has the form

result  PBLP  1  Read and PBLP  1  W rite and PBLP  2  . The HAC’s CheckAccess must have
the form

result  PRBAC  1andPRBAC  2 and PBLP  1  Read and PBLP  1  W rite and PBLP  2  ,
but the preliminary HAC model has the following postcondition instead:

result 
PRBAC  1andPRBAC  2  and

result  PBLP  1  Read and PBLP  1  Write and PBLP  2  . A com-
position directive is needed to change this specification.
The post-merge composition directive that replaces the specification of CheckAccess in
the preliminary HAC model is given below:
replacePostSpec Session::CheckAccess
with  result = self.GetAllActiveRoles().Permission  exists (p 
p.Target  includes(tar) and p.OperationType  includes(op)))
and
(op.Type = Read and
self.SecurityLevel.GetAllDominatees()  includes (t.SecurityLevel))
or (op.Type = Write and self.SecurityLevel = t.SecurityLevel) 
Enforcing the policies PRole  User and PRole  Session in PHAC can be accomplished by
defining an appropriate relationship between Role and SecurityLevel. The policies can
then be expressed in terms of this relationship. The post-merge directives create and add
shown in Table 5.1 can be used to add an association between Role and SecurityLevel in
the prelimnary HAC aspect model. The association is shown as a dark line in Fig. 5.3.
The following directives create an association named RoleSecurityLevel between Role and
SecurityLevel with two associstion ends, RoleSecLevelEnd and SecLevelRoleEnd:
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RoleSecLevelEnd = createProperty  isComposite = false, aggregation = none,
type = HAC::Role, opposite = SecLevelRoleEnd, lower = x1, upper = x2 
SecLevelRoleEnd = createProperty  isComposite = false, aggregation = none,
type = HAC::SecurityLevel, opposite = RoleSecLevelEnd, lower = 1, upper = 1 
RoleSecurityLevel = createAssociation  name = “RoleSecurityLevel”,
isDerived = false, memberEnd = [RoleSecLevelEnd, SecLevelRoleEnd] 
Both association ends are non-composite and non-aggregation ends. The multiplicity in
RoleSecLevelEnd is parameterized (i.e. x1 .. x2), but the multiplicity in SecLevelRoleEnd
is ‘1’ because a role must be associated with only one security level. These three model
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Figure 5.3: Class Model Template View of the Hybrid Access Control Aspect Model
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The existence of the new association allows one to state the policies PRole  User,
PRole  Session, and PRole  Target in PHAC property as follows:
  PRole  User: A user’s security level must dominate the security level of the role that
was assigned to that user.
context Session
inv: self.User.Role  forAll(r  self.User.SecurityLevel.GetAllDominatees()
 includes(r.SecurityLevel))
  PRole  Session: A session’s security level must be equal to the security level of the role
that was activated for that session.
context Session
inv: self.Role  forAll(r  self.SecurityLevel = r.SecurityLevel)
HAC operations that create or destroy links between (1) users and security lev-
els, (2) users and roles, (3) sessions and roles, and (4) sessions and security levels
must ensure that the above policies are enforced. Therefore, the specifications as-
sociated with the following HAC operations must be changed: User::AssignRole,
Session::AddActiveRole, User::CreateSession. The property stated in PRole  User should be
checked before an AssignRole operation is invoked, and PSession  User should be checked
before AddActiveRole or CreateSession operations are invoked. The addPreSpec directive
is used to modify the preconditions of these operations accordingly:
addPreSpec  PRole  User  to User::AssignRole
addPreSpec  PRole  Session  to Session::AddActiveRole
addPreSpec  PRole  Session  to User::CreateSession





self.GetAllActiveRoles().Permission  exists (p 
p.Target  includes(tar) and p.OperationType  includes(op)))
and
(op.Type = Read and
self.SecurityLevel.GetAllDominatees()  includes (t.SecurityLevel))
or (op.Type = Write and self.SecurityLevel = t.SecurityLevel)
The new specifications associated with AssignRole, AddActiveRole, and CreateSession
operations are given below (added OCL expressions are shown in bold):
context User :: AssignRole (r : Role) : Boolean
pre: self.Role  excludes (r)
and self.GetAuthorizedRoles()  forAll(r1  r1.SSD  excludes (r))
and
self.Role  forAll(r  self.SecurityLevel.GetAllDominatees()  includes(r.SecurityLevel)
post: self.Role=self@pre.Role  including(r)
context Session :: AddActiveRole (r : Role) : Boolean
pre: self.Role  excludes (r)
and self.User.GetAuthorizedRoles()  includes(r)
and
self.Role  forAll(r  self.SecurityLevel = r.SecurityLevel








self.Role  forAll(r  self.SecurityLevel = r.SecurityLevel
post: result.oclIsNew()




and self.Session=self@pre.Session  including(result)





















Figure 5.4: Overview of RBAC and BLP Composition
Fig. 5.4 is an expansion of the Compose Aspect Models activity shown in Fig. 5.2 that
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summarizes the activities involved in composing the RBAC and BLP aspect models. The
pre- and post-merge composition directives and the RBAC and BLP aspect models are the
inputs to the composition activity. The pre-merge directives are used to rename elements
in the BLP aspect model as described in this section. The renamed BLP aspect model
is then merged with the RBAC aspect model to produce a preliminary HAC model. The
post-merge directives are then applied to the preliminary HAC aspect model. These direc-
tives change the operation specifications and add an association to ensure that the required
policies are enforced in the composed aspect model.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have demonstrated an approach to using composition directives to inte-
grate two aspect models with an example from the military domain which requires appli-
cations that enforce integrated RBAC and BLP policies. The composed aspect describes
the integration of RBAC feature and BLP features independently of the primary model.
One advantage is that the interactions of the aspects can be understood in isolation without
requiring the comprehension of the application. The second advantage is that it reduces
the number of times the composition process must be applied – this is significant when the
composed aspect is used in several applications.
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Chapter 6
A Verifiable Model Composition
Approach
In this chapter, we illustrate how the composition of the aspect models and a primary model
can be carried out in a verifiable manner. A key issue in applying the AOM approach has
been determining whether composition of aspect models and a primary model produces a
composed model that has specified properties. In the previous AOM composition approach
[31, 69], the composed model is analyzed after the composition of context-specific aspect
models and the primary model in order to uncover emergent behaviors that result in viola-
tions to desired properties or identify undesirable interactions between aspect functionality
and other behaviors described in the primary model. However the problem with this post-
composition analysis is that it is difficult to identify which part of composition caused the
problem because the composition is already completed.
We extend the previous model composition approach to support the generation of proof
obligations that must be discharged in order to establish that a desired property holds in the
composed model. In our composition approach, class diagrams are merged first, but the
entire composition does not end until after the proof obligation is generated and evaluated.
6.1 Overview










Figure 6.1: An overview of verifiable composition in the AOM approach
verifiable model composition in our approach is accomplished in the following two steps1:
1. merging class diagrams : Composition of an aspect and a primary model involves
merging a context-specific aspect model2 and a primary model. We use the name-
base class model composition technique by France et al. [31] to match model ele-
ments and bring matched elements together to have the merged class diagram. Un-
matched model elements shown in one model are added to the merged class dia-
gram as well unless it is differently directed by any of composition directives. Other
changes to default merging process can be indicated by composition directives.
2. generating and evaluating proof obligation : From the property to verify that is spec-
ified in OCL and the specification of an operation in the merged class diagram, the
proof obligation is generated and evaluated. Discharging the proof obligation can
help one identify the sources of problems when the obligations do not hold.
1Note that the composition in our approach is a black-box composition in that users don’t see any other
intermediate composition steps except the merged class model and generated proof obligation.
2A context-specific aspect model is obtained by instantiating aspect model using application specific
values. For details on aspect instantiation, refer to Section 3.5.
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The types of correctness checks that can be carried out on a model are determined by
the types of formally stated properties in the model and the types of derivations that can be
supported by the properties. The properties targeted by our approach are concerned with the
effects of operations. Operation specifications in UML models contain preconditions3 and
postconditions4 expressed in the Object Constraint Language (OCL) and thus can support
checking of behavioral properties that can be stated in terms of the effects of operations in
object states, which are specified in terms of preconditions and postconditions.
To specify that a message invocation event has taken place, the messaging expression
that includes the isSent operator (denoted as ˆ)is used in postconditions. This operator




oˆOpr().hasReturned() and oˆOpr().result() = true
The above postcondition specifies a message event in an interaction diagram, which
states that a message event Opr has been sent to an object o and the postcondition be-
comes true if the message event has already finished executing and has returned a true
boolean value. When all message invocations between objects are explicitly specified in
the postconditions of the operation as shown above, interaction diagrams, such as sequence
diagrams, can be derived from those operation specifications.
Therefore, our verifiable composition technique requires the operation specification
specified in one of the following format, where Op is a triggering operation of a sequence
3A precondition is a boolean expression that must be true at the moment that the operation starts its
execution [91].
4A postcondition is a boolean expression that must be true at the moment that the operation ends its
execution [91].
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diagram in the merged class model and Opri represents a set of sub-operations that are
invoked by Op:





oiˆOpri(pi).hasReturned() and oiˆOpri(pi).result() = Val   Exprmsg  i
and
Q  Exprnon  msg




oiˆOpri(pi).hasReturned()  Exprmsg  i
and
Q  Exprnon  msg
In either specification format shown above, the part denoted by Exprmsg  i states condi-
tions under which messages are sent by the sub-operations Opri, and the part denoted by
Exprnon  msg represents the remainder part of expression that does not have any message
invocation. Exprmsg  i can be simply represented by “xi.hasReturned()” if a sub-operation
Opri has no return value.
The property to verify is written based on a triggering operation of which behavior
affects the property. A sequence diagram is going to describe the sequence of messages
that will be invoked by a triggering operation under our interest. Therefore, this style
of writing operation pre- and postconditions makes it possible for one to generate proof
obligations as a sequence diagram is obtained.
In our approach, an operation specification Pbeh and the proof obligation PO are
defined as follows:
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Definition 1 An operation specification Pbeh is a condition that must be satisfied immedi-
ately after execution of an operation. Formally,
Pbeh = Ppre@pre and Ppost
where Ppre@pre denotes the expression obtained from Ppre by replacing each property
name p occurring in Ppre by p@pre.
For example, consider the following specification for the operation LowerByOne in an ob-
ject of the class A that has an attribute named attr:
context A::LowerByOne()
pre: attr  0
post: attr = attr@pre - 1
attr in the precondition is replaces by attr@pre and thus the operation behavior speci-
fication (Pbeh) is defined as follows :
Pbeh = attr@pre  0 and attr = attr@pre - 1
Definition 2 The proof obligation PO is defined as Pbeh implies Pprop, where Pbeh is an
operation specification in an merged class model and Pprop is the property to be verified.
Verification of the property requires discharging this implication obtained as a PO.
6.2 A Composition Example
In this section we illustrate how the composition of two models can be verified using
our composition approach. Consider the following example models given in Fig. 6.2.
Fig. 6.2(a) shows a simple primary model that has two operations op1 and op2. The class
model shown in Fig. 6.2(a) will be merged with an aspect class model given in Fig. 6.2(b)
according to the class diagram composition approach proposed by Straw et al. [86]. A
composition directive replacePostSpec will be applied to replace the postcondition that has
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pre: true
































attr3 >= 0 implies 
attr3 < 0 implies result = 1
and
 result = attr3+1
sd SDAop2sd SDPop1









Figure 6.2: partial class/sequence diagrams for example models
been obtained by merging two matching operations in the class B. Fig. 6.3 is obtained as a
merged class diagram.
Fig. 6.4 shows an overview of our verifiable composition approach. The composition
of the primary model class diagram and the aspect model class diagram are accomplished
through the named activity Merge Class Diagrams ((1) in Fig. 6.4) according to the class
diagram composition algorithm proposed by [86]. In Fig. 6.4, specifying the given property
statement in OCL provides the property to be verified denoted as Pprop (refer to the action






















attr3 >= 0 implies 
attr3 < 0 implies result = 1
and








Figure 6.3: A class diagram obtained by merging the two class diagrams in Fig. 6.2(a) and
Fig. 6.2(b)
class diagram











P(2) Specify Property in OCL
primary
model
(3) Generate Proof Obligation
Figure 6.4: An activity diagram showing the verifiable composition approach
this property when a primary model and context-specific aspect model are composed. In
our approach, all message invocations in the composed model are explicitly specified when
the operation specifications of the class diagrams are composed under effects of relevant
composition directives. Therefore a composed sequence diagram is derived from those
operation specifications in the composed class diagram as illustrated in Fig. 6.4(refer to
77
(3)). While a sequence diagram is incrementally derived from the operation specifications,
a proof obligation is generated, evolves, and is evaluated. If any faulty composition is
notified during the evaluation, the current sequence diagram, which is partially derived at
that point, and the current proof obligation may be used to determine at which part of the
composition the property fails to hold. Otherwise, a sequence diagram is obtained.
Fig. 6.5 illustrates the detailed steps showing how proof obligation can be generated
in our approach. The first sequence diagram increment is created, which has a triggering
operation event with a lifeline of an object of the context class in which the property to be
verified Pprop is specified (action (3a) in Fig. 6.5). By tracing this partial sequence diagram
back to the relevant operation in the composed class diagram, the proof obligation, PFi
where i is 1, is obtained (action (3b)). As defined earlier, the implication Pbeh implies Pprop
forms the proof obligation. Discharging a proof obligation, PF1, requires the information
under which condition PF1 holds. When an expression in the proof obligation includes
any message invocations, discharging requires to know the condition under which its sub-
messages hold, which may require to increment the next message events to the sequence
diagram. Therefore, we propose to identify a part of expression (denoted as Exprmsg) that
includes invoking sub-messages (action (3c)) and verify other parts of expression first by
assuming Exprmsg returns true (action (3d) in Fig. 6.5). The proof obligation obtained from
this step is referred as PFi’ in Fig. 6.5. PFi’ is evaluated (action (3e) in Fig. 6.5). Any
contradiction found from evaluating PFi’ uncovers a faulty composition and the current
sequence diagram and proof obligation can be used to guide which point of the composition
results in the failure (action (3f) in Fig. 6.5). On the other hand, if no contradiction is
found from evaluating PFi’, now one needs to increment the current sequence diagram
(action (3g) in Fig. 6.5). Selecting a further message invocation, op, is derived from the
postcondition of operation in the composed class diagram. Exprmsg of the PFi is replaced
by the postcondition of the operation to be invoked (action (3h) in Fig. 6.5). At this step, a









proof obligation PF i’
increment: SD i
i−th sequence diagram











and display SD i and PFi
 and PFiSD i
in PF i





(3a) Create 1st sequence
diagram increment
(3b) Generate proof obligation
[else]
(3f) Notify of faulty composition
that includes invocation of op
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(3h) Replace Exp_msg
with postcondition of op




[contradiction found] (3j) Notify of faulty composition
[else]
(3k) Display 
(3i) Evaluate proof obligation PFi
proof obligation: PF  or PFi             i’   
Figure 6.5: An activity diagram showing the process of generating proof obligation from
the merged class diagram
(3c)). When no further message invocation ( Exprmsg) is included in the proof obligation,
the current proof obligation is evaluated (action (3i)). If any contradiction is found from
the evaluation, the faulty composition is notified with information about current status of
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composition, that is, the current sequence diagram and proof obligation expression (action
(3j)).
This approach allows composers to determine the point in the composition at which the
property fails to hold. The information that is available when the composition is stopped
can be used by a developer to determine what needs to be done to correct the situation.
We demonstrate the steps that one needs to follow for the use of our verifiable compo-
sition approach to compose the two models shown in Fig. 6.2(a) and Fig. 6.2(b).
(1) Merge class diagrams. The two class diagrams shown in Fig. 6.2(a) and Fig. 6.2(b)
are merged to create the model shown in Fig. 6.3.
  The class B in the primary model and the class B in the aspect model are
matched when we use model element names to identify the elements that are to
be merged.
– The two attributes with the name of attr2 are merged to form a single
attribute in the merged class model (see Fig. 6.3).
– The operation op2 in the class B of the primary model is merged with the
operation op2 in class B of the context-specific model using the composi-
tion directive replacePostSpec. The operation op2 in the composed model
thus has the postcondition that came from the op2 in the aspect model. The
stereotype  merged  is used to denote that the operation behavior has
been changed by the merge.
  All other model elements (i.e., the class A with its attribute attr1 and operation
op1, another class C with its attribute attr3 and operation op3, and two associ-
ations) are included in the composed class diagram with no modifications.
(2) Specify the property to be verified, PProp, using OCL. In this example, the property,
PProp, is the condition that must be established by an operation op1 and is stated as
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follows:
If the operation op1 is completed, then attr1 in the object a of A must be greater
than attr3 in the object c of C.
The above statement can be specified, using the OCL, as follows:
context A
inv: attr1  self.B.C.attr3
In the above, the property to be verified is specified in the context of the op1
operation in the class A.
(3) Generating the proof obligation. The proof obligation is generated from the opera-
tion specification Pbeh and the property to verify Pprop and a partial sequence diagram
will be obtained while the proof obligation is generated.
(3a) Create the first sequence diagram increment SD1. In this example, the com-
position starts with an event of operation op1 in an object of the class A and
further operation events are identified as the composition follows. Therefore, a
partial sequence diagram that shows only one operation op1 sent to a lifeline of
an object of A is created (refer to Fig. 6.6(a)).
(3b) Generate a proof obligation PF1. The operation behavior specification Pbeh
for the composed sequence diagram SDCOp1 is obtained from the operation
specification of op1 in Fig. 6.3 and is given below:
Pbeh
= Ppre@pre and Ppost
= true and
(bˆop2().hasReturned() and bˆop2().result() = v1)
and
(v1  0 and attr1 = v1 + 2)
= (bˆop2().hasReturned() and bˆop2().result() = v1)
and
(v1  0 and attr1 = v1 + 2)
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((b^op2().hasReturned() and b^op2().result()=v1)







: ((b^op2().hasReturned() and b^op2().result()=v1)
and (v1>0 and attr1 = v1+2))
: attr1 > self.B.C.attr3
imples
result = v2)
and (v1 = v2)
and (v1>0 and attr1 = v1+2))
implies
attr1 > self.B.C.attr3






















(a) SD is created1
(c) SD is obtained2
(e) SD is obtained3
(b) PF1 is generated.
(d) PF1 evolves to PF2.




((attr3 >= 0 implies result = attr3+1 and v2=attr3+1
and




Figure 6.6: Generating the proof obligation while identifying which message invocation
will follow in a sequence diagram
Therefore, the proof obligation PF1 is generated from Pbeh and Pprop at the
time of composition shown in Fig. 6.6(a) and is shown in Fig. 6.6(b).
(3c) Identify an expression, Exprmsg, that includes the invocation of op in PF1.
Identified part of expression is denoted by Exprmsg as shown below.
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Proof Obligation 1: PF1
context A
((bˆop2().hasReturned() and bˆop2().result() = v1)   (P1  1): Exprmsg
and
(v1  0 and attr1 = v1 + 2))  (P1  2): Exprnon  msg
implies
attr1  self.B.C.attr3  (PProp)
(3d) Replace Exprmsg with “true”. Discharging a proof obligation requires the
information about the conditions under which the condition labeled in either
P1  1 or P1  2 in PF1 holds. However, one does not have the information
on invoking operation op2 until the operation event is actually added to the
sequence diagram. Therefore, we assume P1  1 is true for now in order to verify
other parts of the expression. The following proof obligation PF1’ is obtained
at this step (not shown in Fig. 6.6):
Proof Obligation 1’: PF1’
context A
(true  P1  1
and
(v1  0 and attr1 = v1 + 2))  (P1  2)
implies
attr1  self.B.C.attr3  (PProp)
and it is reduced into the following:
Proof Obligation 1’: PF1’
context A
(v1  0 and attr1 = v1 + 2)   (P1  2)
implies
attr1  self.B.C.attr3  (PProp)
(3e) Evaluate a proof obligation PF1’. In this step, we have the expression with re-
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spect to v1, attr1, and attr3. If any contradiction is found, discharge fails and
the composition must stop (refer to action (3f)). In this example, no contradic-
tion is found based on the given information .Therefore, now we go back to our
first assumption that P1  1 is true and it requires to add the next increment to the
current sequence diagram (refer to the increment of an index i in Fig. 6.6.
(3g) Add the next message event op2 to the sequence diagram. To evaluate
P1  1, one needs to know about the conditions under which the op2 operation
sent to an object b returns true in the composed model. Therefore the message
event op2 is added to the current sequence diagram (refer to Fig. 6.6(c)).
(3h) Replace Exprmsg in PF1 by the post condition of the op2 operation. This
observation leads that the condition labeled in P1  1 in PF1 is replaced by the
the postcondition that determines when the op2 operation in b object of the
composed model returns true. Note that v1 = v2 is added into the replaced part
as well to ensure that those two return values, v1 and v2, are same.
The postcondition of op2 operation of b in the composed model (see Fig. 6.3)
is given below:
context B::op2()
(cˆop3().hasReturned() and cˆop3().result() = v2)
implies result = v2
Therefore, the resulting proof obligation PF2 is as follows (also shown in
Fig. 6.6(d)):
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Proof Obligation 2: PF2
context A
(((cˆop3().hasReturned() and cˆop3().result() = v2)   (P2  1)
implies
result = v2 )  (P2  2)
and
v1 = v2  (P2  3)
and
(v1  0 and attr1 = v1 + 2)   ) (P1  2)
implies
attr1  self.B.C.attr3  (PProp)
The current proof obligation PF2 still includes an expression that requires the
result of invoked sub-operation op3 (refer to P2  1).
(3d) Replace Exprmsg with “true”. Assuming that “ (P2  1) implies (P2  2)” is true
for now gives us the following:
Proof Obligation 1’: PF2’
context A
(v1 = v2  (P2  3)
and
(v1  0 and attr1 = v1 + 2))  (P1  2)
implies
attr1  self.B.C.attr3  (PProp)
By v1 = v2 given in (P2  3, all occurrences of v1 in (P1  2) are replaced with v2
and the changed (P1  2) is now labeled with (P2  4).
context A
(v2  0 and attr1 = v2 + 2)   (P2  4)
implies
attr1  self.B.C.attr3  (PProp)
(3e) Evaluate a proof obligation PF2’. Again, no contradiction is found based on
the given information. Therefore, discharging proof obligation PF2 requires
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determining the conditions under which the implication of (P2  1) and (P2  2) is
true. The next message event needs to be added to the current sequence diagram
(refer to the increment of an index i in Fig. 6.6.
(3g) Add the next message event op3 to the sequence diagram. The message
event op3 is added to the current sequence diagram (refer to Fig. 6.6(e)).
(3h) Replace Exprmsg in PF2 by the post condition of the op3 operation. This
step requires us to evaluate whether the implication with (P2  1) and (P2  2)
holds or not. Again, we must know about the conditions under which the op3
operation in the c object returns true. This observation leads to a modified
proof obligation in which the condition labeled in (P2  1) is replaced by the
postcondition that determines when the op3 operation in c object returns true.
That is, (P2  1) is replaced by the postcondition of op3 operation in c.
The postcondition of op3 operation in c is repeated below:
context C::op3()
attr3  0 implies result = attr3 + 1
and
attr3  0 implies result = 1
Therefore, the resulting proof obligation PF3 (also shown in Fig. 6.6(f))
is as follows:
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Proof Obligation 3: PF3
context A
((attr3  0 implies result = attr3 + 1 and v2 = attr3 + 1  (P3  1)
and
attr3  0 implies result = 1 and v2 = 1)  (P3  2)
and
result = v2 )  (P2  2)
and
v1 = v2  (P2  3)
and
(v1  0 and attr1 = v1 + 2)   (P1  2)
implies
attr1  self.B.C.attr3  (Prop)
Note that v2 = attr3 + 1 and v2 = 1 are added to (P3  1) and (P3  2) respectively
as done in the previous step.
At this point, no further message invocation is included in the current proof
obligation PF3 shown above. Therefore it can be evaluated. Any failure to
discharge it may reveal the problem in the composition.
(3i) Evaluate a proof obligation PF3. In this example, no contradiction is found
based on the given information.
(3k) Display the composed sequence diagram SDi and the generated proof obligation.
6.3 A Pilot Study: Composing an RBAC Aspect with a
Banking Application
In this section, we present a context-specific RBAC aspect model for banking applications
and outline how the RBAC aspect model is composed with a banking application primary

















Figure 6.7: A partial class diagram for a banking application (a primary model)
6.3.1 A Banking Application Primary Model
Fig. 6.7 shows a partial class diagram in the banking application primary model. The
application allows users to carry out trans f er, withdraw, and deposit transactions on ac-
counts. The class BankUser describes bank users, Account describes bank accounts, and
Controller describes objects that coordinate transactions on bank entities (in this applica-
tion, Controller has only one instance - the OCL constraint expressing this multiplicity
restriction is not shown).
The dynamic view of the primary model consists of a set of interaction diagrams.
In this section we show the sequence diagram and OCL specification for the trans f er
operation only. As shown in Fig. 6.8, a trans f er operation results in the invocation of two
other operations (withdraw and deposit). Operation specifications for trans f er, withdraw






p := withdraw(amount) : Boolean



















 The message withdraw sent to fromAccount and
 the message deposit sent to toAccount have
 returned and their return values are true
result =
(fromAccountˆwithdraw(amount).hasReturned() and







 If the value of balance before the execution
 is less than the value of amount, the operation returns false,
 otherwise, a new balance is obtained
 by subtracting the amount from the old balance
if balance@pre  = amount
then balance = balance@pre-amount and result = true






 the value of balance after execution is
 equal to the sum of amount
 and the value of balance before execution
balance = balance@pre + amount and result = true
6.3.2 The RBAC Aspect Model
As described in the previous chapters, RBAC is used to protect information resources
(referred to as targets) from unauthorized access. There are many variations of RBAC,
each specifying and enforcing a set of access control constraints. In this chapter we focus
only on constraints in the hierarchical SSD RBAC aspect model that was described in
Section 4.2. The class diagram template of the hierarchical SSD RBAC is repeated in

























RevokePermission (p : Permission):Boolean





























Figure 6.9: The class model template view of the hierarchical SSD RBAC aspect model
and CheckAccess in the Session template are given below. As shown in the operation
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specification templates for Operation, operation specification templates can include
binding directives that determine how context-specific aspect models are produced from
templates when simple instantiation is not sufficient.
context Session::Operation(tar:Target 1..*, params *):Boolean
 Operation takes 1 or more tar arguments and 0 or more params arguments
pre: true
 This operation can be invoked in any state
post:
 The operation returns true if each call to CheckAccess returns true
 (indicating that the session has permission to perform the operation
 on the target), and the DoOperation has returned successfully,
 otherwise it returns false.
 Start of constraint in postcondition:
Repeat for i = 1 to N; N = " tar 
 Repeat is a binding directive that causes elements within its scope
 to be repeated N times when instantiated. " tar returns
 the number of tar arguments.
(self ˆ CheckAccess(tar-i: Target, op: OperationType).hasReturned() and
self ˆ CheckAccess(tar-i: Target, op: OperationType).result() = true) and 
 represents the sending of the i-th CheckAccess message to
 itself (the session object). Each CheckAccess message invokes an operation
 that checks whether the session has permission to perform the operation
 on each target, tar.
 End of Repeat block
(? ˆ DoOperation(tar:Target *, params *).hasReturned() and
? ˆ DoOperation(tar:Target *, params *).result() = true)
 represents the sending of the DoOperation message to an
 unknown object (the object is provided when the template is instantiated
 and an instantiated template is incorporated into a primary model).
 End of Operation specification
context Session::CheckAccess(tar:Target, op:OperationType) : Boolean
pre: true
post:
 The operation returns true if there exists an assigned role that
 is associated with at least one permission that grants the operation, op,
 access to the target, tar, Otherwise, it returns false.
result = self.GetAllActiveRoles().Permission
 exists(p  p.Target  includes(tar) and p.OperationType  includes(op))




indicates that values bound to this must be exactly
the values bound to params* in |Operation
:|Session
indicates a set of 0 or more parameters
indicates a set of 1 or more targets




indicates enclosed area is
ack := |DoOperation(|tar1..*,|params*):ReturnType 0..1 
[ack = true
|Operation(|tar:|Target 1..*, |params*):|ReturnType 0..1
ack:= CheckAccess(|tar:|Target, |op:|OperationType):Boolean
Figure 6.10: SDAOperation sequence diagram template
The sequence diagram template SDAOperation shown in Fig. 6.10 describes the fol-
lowing pattern of behavior:
(1) A sender sends an operation call message (Operation
 #$% ) to a session object.
(2) The session object checks whether the user is authorized to invoke the requested oper-
ation on each target. This check is described by the referenced sequence diagram shown in
Fig. 6.10 (indicated by the ref fragment) and is performed for each target passed in as an
argument to Operation. If the access is not authorized for a target (i.e., ack  f alse) then
the Session object returns f alse to the sender, indicating that access is not granted. The
sequence diagram fragment enclosed by the Repeat box describes this pattern of behavior.
The Repeat is a binding directive indicating that the enclosed fragment is repeated N times,
where N is the number of targets given as arguments (indicated by #tar).
(3) If the access is authorized, then the Session object requests that the operation be per-




























































RevokePermission (p : Permission):Boolean




Figure 6.11: A context-specific core RBAC class diagram
6.3.3 Instantiating the RBAC Aspect Model for a Banking Application
Composing the RBAC aspect model’s class diagram and the banking application’s class di-
agram involves instantiating the RBAC model and composing the resulting context-specific
class diagram with the banking application’s class diagram.
An instantiation of the class diagram template of the RBAC aspect model is shown in
Fig. 6.11. The bindings used to instantiate the aspect model indicate where in the primary
model the context-specific aspect model elements will be incorporated. For example,
the bindings, (BankUser, User), (Account, Target), indicate that the instantiated User
template class in the aspect model is to be merged with the BankUser class in the primary
model, and the instantiated Target template class in the aspect model is to be merged
with the Account class in the primary model. The instantiations of class templates Role
(BankRole), and Session (BankSession) are new model elements that are to be included in
the composed model. The Operation template in the Session class template is instantiated
three times to produce the trans f er, withdraw and deposit operations in BankSession.
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The enumeration values in TransactionTypeEnum (T RANSFER, WITHDRAW , and
DEPOSIT) are instantiations of an attribute template OpType. The operation specification
template associated with the Operation template is also instantiated for each of these
operations. For example, the trans f er operation in BankSession class of the aspect model






 Statement in Repeat block of template is instantiated
 twice because there are two targets











?ˆtransfer(fromAccount, ...).result() = true)
Instantiation of the CheckAccess specification template produces the following specifi-






 exists(p  p.Account  includes(tar)
and p.TransactionType  includes(op))
The SDAOperation sequence diagram template is instantiated three times to produce
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context-specific sequence diagrams corresponding to the BankSession operations trans f er,
withdraw and deposit. The three sequence diagrams produced from the template are named









return false[ack = false]
[ack=true]ack:= checkAccess(toAccount:Account, TRANSFER:TransactionType):Boolean
[ack = true]
ack := transfer(fromAccount:Account,toAccount:Account,amount:Money) : Boolean
return ack
return false[ack = false]
ack:= SDAcheckAccess:Boolean
ref
Figure 6.12: SDAtransfer: Context-specific sequence diagram for the trans f er operation
in BankSession
6.3.4 Merging a Context-specific RBAC Aspect Model with a Primary
Model
The basic class diagram composition procedure merges classes with the same name and
includes elements that appear in primary or aspect class diagram but not in the other (For a
detailed description of class diagram composition, refer to more complex examples given
ack:= checkAccess(fromAccount:Account, WITHDRAW:TransactionType):Boolean
return false[ack = false]









Figure 6.13: SDAwithdraw: Context-specific sequence diagram for the withdraw operation
in BankSession
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[ack = false] return false









Figure 6.14: SDAdeposit: Context-specific sequence diagram for the deposit operation in
BankSession
in France et al. [31] and Reddy et al. [73]. The result of merging the aspect model’s class



























































Figure 6.15: Class diagram of the composed model
Incorporating the access control behavior into the banking application requires that the
transfer operation specification in the primary model’s Controller class (see P-SPEC-1)
be modified so that the calls to the withdraw and deposit operations are authorized before
being sent to the target accounts. The needed modifications are defined by a composition
directive, replacePostSpec, that replaces calls to the operations in target accounts by
calls to the withdraw and deposit operations in BankSession. The result is the following











The unknown object (represented by “?”) shown in the trans f er operation in
BankSession class of the composed model is now associated with the Controller and the
















Controllerˆtransfer(fromAccount, toAccount, amount).result() = true)
6.3.5 Specifying the Property to Verify
A desired property of the trans f er behavior in the composed model is specified and proof
obligations are generated as the SDPtrans f er sequence diagram in the primary model
(Fig. 6.8) is composed with the SDAtrans f er, SDAwithdraw, SDAdeposit sequence dia-
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grams in the context-specific aspect model (Fig. 6.12, Fig. 6.13, Fig. 6.14). The approach
requires that operation specifications reference the interactions that take place in corre-
sponding interaction diagrams, that is, they must state the conditions under which messages
are sent by the operations.
The property to verify during the trans f er can be stated as follows: If the transfer
operation is authorized on the specified accounts, then, if the source account has enough
funds to cover the transfer amount then the funds will have been transferred by the time the
transfer operation terminates.

















In the above, the property to be verified is specified in the context of the trans f er
operation in the BankSession class. We introduce the veri f y construct to the OCL syntax
to support the specification of properties to be verified. The OCL statement in the veri f y

























p := withdraw(fromAccount,amount) : Boolean
toAccount:Account
fromAccount:Account




q := deposit(amount) : Boolean
[ack = true]
(6)





Figure 6.16: Overview of generating and evaluating the proof obligation
6.3.6 Generating the Proof Obligation
We use Fig. 6.16 to illustrate how a proof obligation evolves while the sequence diagram
describing the trans f er operation in the composed model is derived from the class diagram
composition. Composition should result in a behavior in which calls to trans f er withdraw
and deposit operations are carried out only if the BankSession object is permitted to carry
out the requested operations on the target accounts. The composition procedure that ac-
complishes this performs the following steps (the numbers shown in Fig. 6.16 correspond
to the steps given below):
(1) The initiating trans f er message in the primary model sequence diagram is rerouted
to the BankSession object and the access control behavior described by the SDAtrans f er
sequence diagram is inserted.
(2) If access is granted as a result of carrying out the behavior described by SDAtrans f er,
the trans f er operation in the Controller can be invoked. To reflect this, a composition
directive is used to add a trans f er operation call message directed to the Controller. The
result of steps (1) and (2) describes a situation in which the trans f er operation call is in-
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tercepted by SDAtrans f er and passed on to the Controller object only if access is granted.
(3) The call to the withdraw operation made by the Controller during the invocation of the
trans f er operation is intercepted by the SDAwithdraw sequence diagram.
(4) If access is granted then a withdraw operation call is sent to the account, f romAccount.
(5) The call to the deposit operation made by the Controller during the invocation of the
trans f er operation is intercepted by the SDAdeposit sequence diagram.
(6) If access is granted then a depsoit operation call is sent to toAccount.
In what follows we illustrate how a proof obligation for the TransferProp property evolves
during composition. The property does not hold for the composed model and we will show
how this can be revealed during composition.
The proof obligation and a sequence diagram is obtained as illustrated in Fig. 6.17. In
steps (1) and (2) of the sequence diagram composition described earlier with Fig. 6.16,
the SDAtrans f er sequence diagram is incorporated into the primary model’s trans f er
sequence diagram. The initial sequence diagram is derived from the current composition
(refer to Fig. 6.17(a)). At this point, the proof obligation can be expressed as an implication
P1 implies TransferProp, where P1 specifies the condition under which the trans f er
operation in the BankSession object returns true. The postcondition for trans f er is
repeated below:





and (selfˆcheckAccess(toAccount, TRANSFER).hasReturned() and
selfˆcheckAccess(toAccount, TRANSFER).result()=true)
and (Controllerˆtransfer(fromAccount, ...).hasReturned() and
Controllerˆtransfer(fromAccount, ...).result() = true))
The following proof obligation (obtained after simplification) is generated as shown
100
(a) SD is created1















(if from.balance@pre >= amount
then from.balance = from.balance@pre−amount)
bankSession^checkAccess(from,withdarw).hasReturned() and





(b) PF1 is generated.





















bankSession^deposit(to,amount).result() = true 
bankSession^deposit(to,amount).hasReturned() and 
and
bankSession^withdraw(from,amount).result() = true 
bankSession^withdraw(from,amount).hasReturned() and replaced by
Figure 6.17: Generating the proof obligation while identifying which message invocation
will follow in a sequence diagram
in Fig. 6.17(b):
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Controllerˆtransfer(fromAccount, ...).result() = true)  (DP)
implies successful-transfer
Discharging PF1 requires information about the conditions under which the condition
labeled (DP) in PF1 holds, that is, the conditions under which the trans f er operation in the
Controller object (called by the doOpMsg message) returns true. This observation leads
to adding the invocation of the trans f er operation in the Controller object to the sequence
diagram (refer to Fig. 6.17(c)) and modifying the proof obligation in which the condition
labeled (DP) is replaced by the part of the postcondition that determines when the trans f er
operation in Controller returns true (refer to Fig. 6.17(d)). The resulting proof obligation
is given below:
Proof Obligation 2: PF2
context BankSession
(bankSessionˆwithdraw(fromAccount,amount).hasReturned() and




Discharging proof obligation PF2 requires determining the conditions under which
the condition labeled by (WD) holds, that is, the conditions under which the withdraw
operation in BankSession returns true. As was done in the previous steps, invoking the
withdraw operation in the Controller is added to the current sequence diagram (refer to
Fig. 6.17(e)) and the proof obligation evolves again by replacing (WD) by the relevant
part of the withdraw postcondition (refer to Fig. 6.17(f)). This process is continued until a
proof obligation that does not hold is produced or until the sequence diagram composition
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is completed.
In this case, a proof obligation that does not hold is obtained after incorporating the
SDAwithdraw sequence diagram into the primary model’s sequence diagram. The proof
obligation is given below:
Proof Obligation 3: PF3
context BankSession
selfˆcheckAccess(fromAccount, withdraw).hasReturned() and
selfˆcheckAccess(fromAccount, withdraw).result()= true and






At this point an inspection of PF3 would reveal that the condition does not hold be-
cause of the presence of the access control behavior that checks whether access to the
withdraw operation is granted. If access to the withdraw operation is not granted, then the
obligation does not hold. There is no guarantee that this case will never happen (i.e., there
are no constraints in the model that preclude this case). At this point the composition can
be stopped knowing that it will produce a model that does not have the required property.
This problem can be fixed by incorporating only the SDAtransfer (i.e., steps (1) and (2))
sequence diagram during the composition. The result is that the check access operation is
only carried out on the trans f er operation, not on the withdraw and deposit operations.
Another solution is to guarantee access to the withdraw and deposit operations whenever
access is granted to a trans f er operation by including an invariant on permission objects
that precludes the above situation in which the obligation failed to hold.
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6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we present an AOM approach that supports verifiable composition of be-
haviors described in access control aspect models and primary models. Given an aspect
model, a primary model, and a specified property, the composition technique produces
proof obligations as the behavioral descriptions in the aspect and primary models are com-
posed. One has to discharge the proof obligations to establish that the composed model has
the specified property. Given an initial proof obligation, its evolution during the process of
establishing sequence diagrams can be mechanized since it essentially involves replacing
specified parts of the proof obligations with parts of operation specifications.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation, we described an AOM approach to isolating features that enforce access
control policies as aspects. To illustrate the approach, RBAC and BLP were modeled as
aspects and they were individually verified against given policy requirements represented
by policy models.
There are cases in which the applications in an organization must enforce more than one
access control policy. In such cases, one needs to integrate multiple access control aspects
and the resulting aspect must enforce the integrated policies. This dissertation shows how
aspects can be composed to produce integrated access control features. One advantage of
integrating aspects instead of composing the aspects one at a time with a primary model,
is that one gets a view of the relationships between concepts in the aspect models that is
not cluttered with concepts from a primary model. The second advantage is that it reduces
the number of times the composition process must be applied – this is significant when the
composed aspect is used in several applications or in multiple places in an application.
It is often necessary to establish that composition yields a model that is correct with
respect to specified properties. In this dissertation we illustrated an approach that supports
generation of proof obligations during the composition of aspects and a primary model.
The approach is used to generate proof obligations that must be discharged in order to
verify properties that constrain the effects of sequences of operations on system states. A
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proof obligation can be discharged manually or with the help of automated tools. If it is
determined that the proof obligation obtained at a point during the composition does not
hold, then the composition can be stopped at that point. The information that is available
when the composition is stopped can be used by a developer to determine what needs to be
done to correct the situation. Composition directives can be used when it is determined that
the problems can be solved by refactoring the models or by overriding default composition
rules. In order to facilitate automation we restrict the form of properties. Given an initial
proof obligation, its modification during the composition essentially involves replacing
specified parts of the proof obligations with parts of operation specifications.
7.1 Lessons Learned
In our approach, access control features are modeled as aspect models using the RBML
template notation. Access control policies are expressed in terms of UML class diagrams
with OCL constraints. Verifying access control aspect models against given policy require-
ments required us to define realization mapping pairs to show the relationship of concepts
in two models. These mapping rules were used to transform the OCL invariants in the pol-
icy model into invariants expressed in terms of aspect model concepts. A difficulty arose
when relating generic and domain-specific concepts: An aspect model describes generic
concepts while a policy model expresses domain-specific concepts. To tackle this problem
we obtained a prototypical UML model from the generic aspect model. The prototypical
model is one of the most-general context-specific models that can be instantiated from the
aspect model. It is obtained by simply replacing parameters with the parameter names. The
multiplicity parameters are replaced with the weakest form of multiplicities allowed by the
aspect model. This prototypical model is used to establish that an aspect model enforces
access control policies expressed as UML class models.
One can claim that directives can be determined only after two models are composed
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once and problems are discovered by evaluating the composed result. However we have
discovered that there are cases that can be anticipated even before the composition. For
example, in case of a postcondition that describes what should be the result of the oper-
ation using result keyword, the default merge rules produce the conjunction of two OCL
expressions that has two result keywords. This is not the desired result (refer to an example
composition for CheckAccess operation shown in Section 5.3). Knowledge of the default
merge rules can also be used to predict composition problems. It is true that selecting
the right composition directives is heavily dependent upon human knowledge. More work
needs to be done on providing support for selecting composition directives.
Our verifiable composition approach allows the policy aspect to be methodically inte-
grated with the application, and the process can also be used to incorporate multiple policies
when it is applied to compose the integrated aspect model with the application. Key chal-
lenges were (1) to determine what types of property to verify and (2) to make the process
of generating and evaluating the proof obligation automatable. In the current approach, we
target properties that constrain the effects of sequences of operations on system states. Op-
eration specifications are written based on a triggering operation of which behavior affects
the property. The verifiable composition in our work is accomplished in two steps. First,
two class diagrams are composed using composition directives to fix any known problems
during the composition. Second, the proof obligation is generated from the property to
verify and the operation specifications in the composed class model.
7.2 Future Work
Selecting composition directives in our aspect composition approach is currently based on
a modeler’s knowledge of the policies. We plan to extend the current approach by treat-
ing the composition directives as transformations and develop a more systematic approach
to selecting composition directives based on pre- and postconditions associated with the
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transformation.
We plan to develop tool support for composition that will include support for generating
proof obligations and also investigating ways of integrating existing proof tools that can be
used to assist in generating and discharging proof obligations during composition of aspect
and a primary model.
Security policies including access control policies may change during a mission and
evolving systems must keep pace with those changes. Our approach can be extended to
evolving security policies. By encapsulating security concerns (in aspects), changes can be
made in the aspect, and the effects can be incorporated into the models through composi-
tion. We will investigate how aspects can be extracted from the composed model, how they
can be modified, and the modified aspect once again woven with the application.
We also plan to explore an approach to the composition with traceable properties that do
not require a post-composition verification. An initial idea is to make properties in aspects
traceable throughout the composition so that the composition may be accomplished in a
manner that the result must have the desired properties. Some kind of treatment of the
traces obtained in the verification when the property is not satisfied would seem to be of
great interest. More precisely, that the representation of the traces should be visual by using
some animated representation of the UML diagrams which could help the user to locate the
error source very quickly. Chapter 5 in this dissertation shows preliminary work in this
direction.
We are also currently investigating techniques for transforming aspect models to pro-
gramming aspects and considering using either the mapping from Themes to implementa-
tion suggested by Clarke et. al [5, 19] or the aspect-based model transformation techniques
suggested by Simmonds et al. [83] as a framework for our extension.
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Appendix A
An RBAC Aspect Model
A.1 Operation specifications for generic RBAC aspect
model
context User:: CreateSession(roles:Set( Role)): Session
pre: self. AssignedRoles  includesAll(roles )
post: result.oclIsNew()
and self. Session=self@pre.  Session  including(result)
and result. Role= roles
context User :: AssignRole (r : Role) : Boolean
pre: self. Role  excludes (r)
post: self. Role=self@pre. Role  including(r)
context Session :: AddActiveRole (r : Role) : Boolean
pre: self. Role  excludes (r)
and self. User. AssignedRoles()  includes(r)
post: self. Role=self@pre. Role  including (r)
context Role:: GrantPemission(p:  Permission)
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pre: self. Permission  excludes(p)
post: self. Permission=self@pre. Permission  including(p)
context User :: DeassignRole (r : Role) : Boolean
pre: self. Role  includes (r)
post: self. Role=self@pre. Role  excluding(r)
and self. Session. Role  excludes (r))
context Session :: DropActiveRole (r : Role) : Boolean
pre: self. Role  includes (r)
post: self. Role=self@pre. Role  excluding (r)
context User :: DeleteSession (s :  Session) : Boolean
pre: self. Session  includes (s)
post: self. Session=self@pre. Session  excluding (s)
context Session:: Operation(  tar: Target 1..*,  params *):Boolean
 Operation takes 1 or more tar arguments and
 0 or more params arguments
pre: true
 This operation can be invoked in any state
post:
 The operation returns true if each call to CheckAccess
 returns true (indicating that the session has permission
 to perform the operation on the target), and the DoOperation
 has returned successfully, otherwise it returns false.
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let Repeat for i = 1 to N; N = "& tar 
 Repeat is a binding directive that causes elements within
 its scope to be repeated N times when instantiated.
 "' tar returns the number of tar arguments.
chkAccMsg-i:OclMessage =
self ˆ CheckAccess(  tar-i: Target,  op: OperationType),
 chkAccMsg-i represents the sending of the i-th
 CheckAccess message to itself (the session object).
 Each CheckAccess message invokes an operation
 that checks whether the session has permission
 to perform the operation on each target, tar.

 End of Repeat block
doOpMsg:OclMessage =
 ? ˆ DoOperation(  tar: Target *,  params *)
 doOpMsg represents the sending of the DoOperation
 message to an unknown object (the object is provided
 when the template is instantiated).
in
 Start of constraint in postcondition:
Repeat for i = 1 to N; N = "' tar 
(chkAccMsg-i.hasReturned() and
chkAccMsg-i.result() = true) and 
 End of Repeat block
(doOpMsg.hasReturned() and doOpMsg.result() = true)
 End of Operation specification
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context Session:: CheckAccess(tar: Target,
op: OperationType) : Boolean
pre: true
post:
 The operation returns true if there exists an assigned
 role that is associated with at least one permission
 that grants the operation, op, access to the target, tar,
 Otherwise, it returns false.
result =
self. GetAllActiveRoles.  Permission
 exists(p  p. Target  includes(tar)
and p. OperationType  includes(op)))
 End of CheckAccess specification
A.2 Operation specifications for Context-specific RBAC
aspect model
context BankUser::CreateSession(roles:Set(BankRole)):BankSession
pre: self.BankRole  includesAll(roles )
post: result.oclIsNew()
and self.BankSession=self@pre.BankSession  including(result)
and result.BankRole= roles
context BankUser :: AssignRole (r : BankRole) : Boolean
pre: self.BankRole  excludes (r)
post: self.BankRole=self@pre.BankRole  including(r)
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context BankSession :: AddActiveRole (r : BankRole) : Boolean
pre: self.BankRole  excludes(r)
and self.User.BankRole  includes(r)




self.BankRole.Permission  exists (p 
p.Account  includes(a) and p.TransactionType  exists(tr  tr.Type=op.Type))
context Account::withdraw(amount:Money):Boolean
pre: balance  = amount
post: (balance = balance@pre-amount and result = true)




 the value of balance after execution is
 equal to the sum of amount
 and the value of balance before execution
(balance = balance@pre + amount and result = true)














then result = doOpMsg.result()
else result = false
endif
else result = false
endif















then result = doOpMsg.result()
else result = false
endif
else result = false
endif
else result = false
endif











if chkAccMsg1.hasReturned() and chkAccMsg2.hasReturned()
then if chkAccMsg1.result()=true and chkAccMsg2.result()=true
then if doOpMsg.hasReturned()
then result = doOpMsg.result()
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else result = false
endif
else result = false
endif




A BLP Aspect Model
B.1 Operation/Invariant templates for BLP
context SecurityLevel::GetAllDominatees(): Set(SecurityLevel)
body: self.dominatee  union(self.dominatee  collect(sl  sl.dominatee)  asSet())
 union(self)
context SecurityLevel::GetAllDominators(): Set(SecurityLevel)
body: self.dominator  union(self.dominator  collect(sl  sl.dominator)  asSet())
 union(self)
context SecurityLevel::GetAllDominatees(): Set(SecurityLevel)
body: self.dominatee  union(self.dominatee  collect(sl  sl.dominatee)  asSet())
 union(self)
context SecurityLevel::AddDominatee (sl:SecurityLevel):Boolean
pre: self  sl
and self.dominatee  excludes(sl)
and self.GetAllDominators()  excludes(sl)
post: self.dominatee=self@pre.dominatee  including(sl)
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context User::CreateSubject(sl:SecurityLevel):Subject
pre: self.SecurityLevel.GetAllDominatees()  includes(sl)
post: result.oclIsNew()
and self.Subject=self@pre.Subject  including(result)
and result.SecurityLevel=sl
context User :: DeleteSubject (sb : Subject) : Boolean
pre: self.Subject  includes (sb)




t.OperationType  includes (op)
and
((op.Type = OperationType::READ and
self.SecurityLevel.GetAllDominatees()  includes (t.SecurityLevel))
or
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